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EDITORIAL

MR HERBERT READ recently described simplicity as the "last infirmity of lazy minds".[1] He was writing about modern art and the complaints of obscurity and complexity that are popularly levelled against it. The article on "The Real Difficulties of Modern Poetry", which appeared in the June number of this journal, suggested that the common complaints about the difficulty of modern poetry arise partly from sloth, from an unwillingness to take the trouble that understanding would require. Charges of obscurity and complexity are now coming to be levelled against theologians almost as much as against artists and poets, and at first sight it would appear that, if the charges can be sustained, they are much more damaging, since it is not the theologian's province to use symbols and imagery in the same way, or under the same licence, as the artist or poet. We shall here consider only the case of alleged obscurity in theology. How far is simplicity in theological writing a recommendation, and how far is it a snare? It may be either. On the one hand, the theologian is under an obligation to say what he has to say as clearly and precisely as possible, and to avoid all mystification and carelessness in the use of words. Swift's precept that "proper words in proper places make the true definition of style" applies universally. Theological writing which is simple in this sense is so far to be recommended, and it is none too common. But the words "as clearly and precisely as possible" beg a large question. Suppose that what a theologian has to say does not admit immediately of neat and complete delineation, then the attempt to achieve simplicity at all costs will involve faithlessness to his appointed task. Again, he may know that what he has to say is unfamiliar, strange and bewildering to his own generation, if not to all generations; then, if he makes use only of words, phrases and constructions that are quite

[1] *Horizon* (May, 1941), p. 312.

familiar, it is not likely that he will succeed in conveying his message to his readers, and indeed he may falsely simplify it to himself. Thus, on the other hand, a striving after premature simplicity may prove a snare both to readers and to writers.

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It was this distinction that Bishop Butler had in mind when in the preface to his *Sermons* he wrote:

> It must be acknowledged, that some of the following Discourses are very abstruse and difficult; or, if you please, obscure; but I must take leave to add, that those alone are judges, whether or no and how far this is a fault, who are judges, whether or no and how far it might have been avoided—those only who will be at trouble to understand what is here said, and to see how far the things here insisted upon, and not other things, might have been put in a plainer manner. . . .
>
> Thus much however will be allowed, that general criticisms concerning obscurity considered as a distinct thing from confusion and perplexity of thought, as in some cases there may be ground for them; so in others, they may be nothing more at the bottom than complaints, that every thing is not to be understood with the same ease that some things are.[1]

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Those who demand " a simple gospel ", or who beg to be instructed in monosyllables, or who rejoice in " the eclipse of the highbrow ", ought generally to be rebuked. Nevertheless, the natural human craving for simplicity, however deplorable some of its manifestations may be, bears witness to a need which in the end assuredly is met, although man's natural powers cannot meet it. Obscurity, paradox, bewilderment, unfamiliarity are bad things; they are evils, but evils which necessarily beset and accompany us on the course of our pilgrimage to God. They will be overcome only when we see Him as He is. At present, if we try prematurely to escape from them, we fall into the even greater evils which arise from false simplification. The simplicity that is in Christ is not the same thing as a completely articulated theology; simplicity is the goal towards which we ever aspire, and of the reality of which we already have through faith an earnest, but it is a hope that looks to God

[1] *Sermons* (O.U.P. Edition, 1850), pp. vii *f.*

and not an achievement of which man is capable in himself. Baron von Hügel never tired of driving home this truth. His passion for drawing fine and elaborate distinctions was a sign not of perversity but of profundity, even if the drawing might well have been done in a more felicitous style.

All religion will ever, in proportion as it is vigorous and pure, thirst after an ever-increasing Unification, will long to be one and to give itself to the One—to follow naked the naked Jesus. Yet all the history of human thought and all the actual experience of each one of us prove that this Unity can be apprehended and developed, by and within our poor human selves, only in proportion as we carefully persist in stopping at the point where it can most thoroughly organize and harmonize the largest possible multiplicity of various facts and forces.[1]

It is significant too that, as the tradition of mystical theology teaches, the " prayer of simplicity " is the final, and not the first, stage in the ascent of the soul towards union with God.

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The temptation to premature simplification, which is indeed a temptation to the deadly sin of sloth, is with us always and everywhere, but in the history of theology there are times when the temptation becomes especially alluring and when theologians are insistently upbraided if they do not yield to it—a time, for instance, when new ground is being broken or maybe old ground that has been neglected, when digging operations are in progress, but when it is too soon to satisfy popular curiosity as to what exactly is going to appear on the site—or (to change the metaphor) when new insights are being received or old ones recovered, but when it is too soon to give a systematic account of their implications or fully to determine their relation to familiar beliefs. In theology we are living now at such a time. Thus Karl Barth was abundantly justified in replying to those who demanded simplicity of him:

The simplicity which proceeds from the apprehension of God in the Bible and elsewhere, the simplicity with which God Himself speaks, stands not at the beginning of our journey but at its end. Thirty years hence we may perhaps speak of simplicity,

[1] F. von Hügel, *The Mystical Element of Religion*, i. 66. *Cp.* John Oman: " As soon as we start to explain anything, it is difficult for our limited minds not to substitute what is easy to understand for the fulness of experience " (*The Natural and the Supernatural*, p. 147).

but now let us speak the truth. For us neither the Epistle to the Romans, nor the present theological position, nor the present state of the world, nor the relation between God and the world, is simple. And he who is now concerned with truth must boldly acknowledge that he cannot be simple.[1]

By all means beseech theologians to speak as precisely and definitely as possible; scrutinize them severely when they use perplexing words; beware of quacks who pass off what is merely irrational or fantastic as though it were profound; but do not echo the silly demand that theologians should speak only in familiar terms. Theology is the last place where we should expect to be let off lightly.

[1] *The Epistle to the Romans*, trans. Hoskyns, p. 5.

The Christian's Concern in Politics

It is a vulgar error to suppose that we can, by political means, establish the Kingdom of God on earth, but the number of Christian men who might fall into this error grows smaller. Indeed, many Christians in this country are becoming rather pessimistic—not avowedly deterministic in their beliefs but very much bitten by the prevailing deterministic turn of the philosophy of history and underrating the powers of human activity in God's service. An example of this way of thinking can be found in Mr D. R. Davies's article in the October (1940) number of Theology. The following sentences from it are all, of course, taken out of their context and, perhaps, do his thought an injustice. His title is " Why are Christians concerned in Politics?"

> Since politics . . . is the historic mechanism which God uses to deflate the human will to sovereignty, to deprive man of his delusion of omnipotence, Christians must concern themselves with it. . . .
>
> From the point of view of the Kingdom of God, there is no spiritual difference between the rule of the capitalist class and that of the proletariate. . . .
>
> Society can no longer function within capitalism. . . . Ah ! but it will function finally within Socialism. . . . It's an illusion, of course, but an illusion of value for the Kingdom of God, because it will close one more avenue (now lying open) of human escape from God.
>
> The Christian attitude to politics: It is support of the untried illusion as against the exhausted, deflated reality. In other words, it is the agitation for what the liberal calls " progress " and the Marxist calls " the next step in historic development " as against what the Tory calls " law and order ". . . . That untried next step is one of the unstormed defences against God. . . . So be progressive so as to push man a step nearer the final alternative of accepting God or going to hell, of repenting or perishing.

With one part of this argument most will agree. No social system has been perfect, and none planned for the future will be. It is indeed the error of Communists and of many Socialists that they naïvely expect to win a temporal heaven by political means. Yet to declare this error of utopianism is not to say that man may not improve his society, may not make it more Christian in character, by

measurable standards. He cannot do this unaided, but then he is not unaided. Nor is this to think of God as "one who will assist and reinforce our powers and purposes", a false view which Professor Farmer, for one, has pointed out in the *Christian News Letter*.[1] Christians can surely seek a juster society as servants, just because they are servants, of the "King whom we obey". One of His purposes which we must discover is that man's life on earth be made not only juster, in accordance with that spirit of justice we can learn from the Gospels, but also easier and more beautiful.

But we must do more than support casuistically the next untried step. Mr Davies's view suffers from serious defects, if it is intended to be one that will inspire men, Christians particularly, to action. It is plain that Socialism is here portrayed as the next evil or illusion in, it seems, an interminable series. No more negative approach to politics could be imagined, for the force of inertia is already so strong that men will not act to advance what is presented to them as pure illusion. It is also asking what a Christian has no right to be asked, that he co-operate in an illusion, a deplorably bad means, so that the good end of man's discovering his dependence on God be realized.

Where, it may be asked, does determinism come into this view? Mainly because politics is conceived of as a stream whose course cannot be turned. We have to co-operate with Socialism merely because it is the next untried thing on the list. There seems to be no thought that a policy which does not partake so greatly of illusion, a social policy more in line with the spirit of the Gospels, might be devised by Christians and advanced by them for the sake of the truths it contains rather than for its attractiveness as an illusion.

How came such a political view ever to be entertained by Christians? It is, perhaps, because of the widespread influence of the school of Spengler and Toynbee. So relentless is the picture they draw of the rise and fall of civilizations, hinting all the time that we are not rising but declining, that we tend to feel ourselves caught up in this process and submit to letting it work itself out rather than actively trying to change it by an heroic exercise of our free wills.

The effect on many minds of Mr Arnold Toynbee's great, but as yet uncompleted, *Study of History* is not one which

[1] April 9, 1941.

the author probably intended. Though for Mr Toynbee himself the rise and fall of civilization, the alternation between creation and destruction, is not necessarily a barren process, many people seem to interpret his work as though it were. The knowledge which some glean from his book is reminiscent of the ancient fable of the physician who discovered the secret of undying temporal life and was destroyed by a thunderbolt which his medical studies had not allowed for. The physician had discovered the secret of life, but the discovery of the secret of death, of decline, may well be as dangerous. Too much introspection is bad for the individual, and it is bad also to found too much on that communal introspection which history is. We should not too easily assume to ourselves the wisdom of God and think to have laid bare the mechanism of man's life on this earth. There may be a rhythm, a cycle of decline and fall, but it is not for us to decide too readily that we are on one or other of the grades. There is a burning life in man, implanted in him by the God who made him that his race may survive. Deny that life, tell him that he cannot look upward to better things, even for a period, and your influence over him is lost.

It may be, for it would be as foolish to ignore our historians as to believe that they can prophesy a certain fate for men of free will, that we are going downhill. One economic system is running down before our eyes. But let us compare our poets:

> I think things draw to an end, the soil is stale . . .

with that melancholy which fell upon men in the fourteenth century, as Huizinga so well describes in his *Waning of the Middle Ages*, and still farther back with those old Christians of the early centuries so dashed in hope that they looked only backwards to glorious Rome and had not before their minds Europe's "white robe of cathedrals" and the Christian doctors and kings to come. Perhaps we shall be going down into the valley, but at its bottom—and here the study of past history is consoling—there will be a bridge or ford leading to a new hill for climbing. We Christians should be the first to find that way and ought not to be drawn hither and thither in the search for it by the mob. As Dr Reinhold Niebuhr finely puts it, God is "engaged in history. For this reason the Christian does not regard the rise and fall of civilizations with equanimity. He takes

historic struggles for justice and freedom seriously and knows that the eternity which fulfils history will not negate what is good in history. It will fulfil what is incomplete and purge what is sinful."[1]

Christian politics depend on the Christian view of man, and that is really what we hold to be God's view of man as disclosed to us in revelation. Now the Christian view of man and its interpretation of revelation is not constant. In history, as in the lives of individuals, it goes to and fro like the pendulum, from hope to despair. It is admirably put in the well-known Elizabethan poem by Sir John Davies:

> I know I am one of nature's little kings,
> Yet to the least and vilest things am thrall.

We, it seems, are reacting from a period when the "little king" view of man has had it all its own way. Our minds, we feel, are "corrupted both in wit and will". Yet, if we are to do anything politically, we must avoid the pessimistic extremity and strike the proper balance. The least we can take is the middle view of man—neither so good that he can ever be expected to escape error nor so bad that all he does is evil.

There is a very simple view of man which, while it does not hide his dependence, allows him his dignity. It is founded on the mystery of God's love for man. This is something that exists and does not have to be explained; it is a point of departure and leads us a long way. The importance of human persons to God is as inescapable as the other view of their nothingness before Him. Man is an object of divine love. This is the measure of the human person's dignity. Before this fact we must seek to preserve the proper balance between humility and pride. In a world so evil it may seem insolent to advance such reasons. But for all their wickedness God has never despaired of men, nor should Christians despair of them. How does this great mystery of God's love for man and the response of love, which man ought to make and hardly ever does, affect action in this world? It reveals, surely, that the good relations of souls with God should be held in our minds in all our thoughts of political action. It seems far from this sublime converse to the field of politics, but just as humble elements like bread and wine are snatched to supernatural

[1] *Christian News-Letter*, May 21, 1941.

uses, so can the counsels of Christian men aid their brothers on their souls' path to God. There are natural obstacles between man and God; there are also man-made ones.

If Christians have overlooked one thing more than another, it is the human body. Yet the condition of the temporal body has eternal effects, for the soul is powerfully constrained by what it inhabits. When we see wasted bodies, we see too often wasted souls or, if not wasted, souls called to a heroic struggle for salvation which was laid upon them not necessarily by God but by man, by the society of men, by forces which can be controlled by politics. This alone calls Christians into direct political action. It is the neglect of duty to wait upon history, accepting with a knowing scepticism the proposed cure of materialist socialism when we might enter politics with a system of our own, designed not only to relieve the present anguish of bodies but to do so by means which allow man to preserve his knowledge of his soul's proper end.

What has been said is enough to make the supreme criterion of political action the good of human persons on their path and pilgrimage to God. Whatever hinders or harms is one of the " unstormed defences " against God. But how, after all this, are we to decide what are the temporal policies for Christians to advance?

It is first necessary to guard against one danger which can stultify all action. It is that Christians, faced by the absolute goodness of God, should expect themselves to produce a temporal pattern of this absolute goodness in their political action. As they can never do this, and will only be disillusioned if they try, it is best to accept imperfection right away. Not only will the Christian diagnosis of the world's evils sometimes be mistaken, but the actions taken to cure these evils are bound often to be wrong. The analogy with the moral life of persons, however, should help us. We persevere through sin; we do not abandon the moral struggle because we know complete virtue is not for us. It is impossible to act in politics entirely rightly, but that is no reason for not acting in politics. We must seek to overcome evil where we think it can be found, because it is God's command, and must make the best use of the light He gives us. On a lower view, we must act politically because of the world, for we should prefer its hatred to its contempt and must seek to escape the fate of Christians in Russia and Germany—a deserved fate.

But because of the likelihood of erroneous political action through the entry of high principles into that obscure sphere in which evil has so great a part, it is vital that the Church, its bishops and priests, be not identified with our politics.

A practical example of the working of this judgment can be seen in the distinction Maritain would have the Catholic press observe. " To speak as a Catholic having a certain temporal position ", he says, " and to speak in the name of Catholicism, are two very different things." Thus there ought to be two kinds of newspaper, " the one specifically catholic and religious, and as a result catholic *by denomination*; the other specifically political or ' cultural ' . . . catholic *in inspiration* only, not by denomination."[1]

This distinction must be preserved in all political action, which though we might call it Christian political action is really no more than action that seeks to be inspired by Christian principles. Nowhere, either in papal encyclicals or Malvern conferences, are we going to find principles which, though sound in themselves, can be applied without error and without some degree of doubt to the temporal scene. Lofty principles, giving an essential basis of unity, are needed, but they can never decide with certainty the merits of a League of Nations policy or a Spanish war. We all know that in every political dispute some right and some wrong will be found on both sides. In the confused moment of decision even men sincerely acting according to their view of Christian principle will interpret that principle differently. It would be lamentable if the Church, as has so often happened in the past, becomes saddled with their passions and mistakes. Let us be careful not to apply too freely the name " Christian " to our publications and associations.

Having guarded ourselves in this way, what part of the field of political action should we first attack? To begin with there is the urgent reform of our health, educational, and nutritional services, without which we can pretend to no equality of opportunity. But if we should enter into the field of social reform, which to-day would seem an inescapable Christian duty, we shall find it filled with Socialists. Maritain envisages our co-operation with these men of goodwill, and in his *True Humanism* gives an outline of the new society which we shall work for together. He

[1] J. Maritain, *True Humanism*, p. 301.

distinguishes between the unity possessed in medieval times, which was founded on a common faith, and the unity possible in modern times, when a common faith no longer exists. We must strive to-day for a " unity of orientation, which proceeds from a common aspiration . . . for a form of common life in better accord with the supra-temporal interests of the person."

What we have to ask ourselves, however, is how a minority of Christians can give an orientation to a society in accord with the supra-temporal interests of the person when the majority with whom they are co-operating believe only in temporal common goods. If we can prophesy anything it is that those who are now Socialists will be less and less attracted by our supra-temporal aim and more and more likely to slip into allegiance to some purely temporal totalitarianism. If we could be certain that Socialists would keep their faith in the importance of human freedom we could co-operate without fear of becoming swamped. The danger is that Socialists, who have for the most part abandoned the Christian beliefs which alone buttress the freedom of the individual, will be in time seduced into some formally materialistic faith. The age of doubt seems over. Everywhere, it seems, a uniformity of belief inside a party is needed for successful political action to-day.

We are left, then, with the question of whether the minority of Christians in this country could gain sufficient political power to " orientate " society towards a unity which would preserve both the values of the Christian faith and the rights of those who do not share it. The cause is not hopeless if only Christians will confess that they have a political and social duty laid on them by their faith, for it is the neglect of this duty that has done much to bring Christianity into disrepute. (" Feed my sheep "—with doctrine only? The masses have sensed the meaning of that command, and for our neglect of it they have judged us sternly, simply, pragmatically.) The Christians possess that secret known and evilly exploited by the Nazis, but forgotten by the Socialists, of man's deep need to serve something greater than himself. The old urge to sacrifice himself for the best presented to him is awake in the man of the masses to-day. It moves him far more than the mere promise of temporal benefits. Is not a " socialism " based on Christianity more likely to fulfil this need than the hard, agnostic but still utopian socialism of Marx?

But nothing can be done until Christians enter the political field, properly organized for political business. Already, it is true, some work of preparation is being done by occasional conferences and by many groups which meet regularly up and down the country. The resolutions of conferences and the findings of groups will, however, disappear into thin air until some central and permanent body is formed to gather, sift and join them into a common thread of practical policy. Once the outlines of a policy have been agreed upon, we should expect to see the forming of new political associations of Christian people to advance that policy (or policies) by all legitimate ways. Let us not suppose that all will be easy. A Christian politics demands for its success a revival of religious life and a renewal of faith. One can form an association, but one cannot command the outpouring of the Spirit, without which the association will do little.

Here, as ever, we can do nothing good of ourselves. Yet we must begin, hoping for God's blessing and aid, for, conscious after long blindness of social wrongs which hinder man's path to God, we cannot stay out of the political field, where alone redress can be won, unless we are content to remain disobedient Christians.

WALTER JAMES.

The Religion of Spiritualists.—II

IN the first part of this study we saw that the Bible compels us to concede the possibility of communications from departed human beings. But Christians will be slow to conclude that the Son of God's return at the Resurrection is a guide to what we may expect in the case of ordinary mortals, and the absence of any attempt on the part of the Apostolic Church to get into touch with the dead creates a strong presumption against the legitimacy of the practice. We cannot say to scientists that this, or any other, effort to push back the frontiers of knowledge is wrong; we must, however, ask whether it has any relevance for religion. The only way in which we can answer this question is by examining the teaching said to have been given by the "guides" on the other side; we must "try the spirits, whether they be of God". We do not rule out *a priori* the possibility of valuable guidance, but we do require

some evidence that the communications deserve our attention. For the benefit of those who have not investigated the subject for themselves I now summarize a few books, most of which were recommended to me by a Spiritualist.

I—Voices from the Middle Ages

Medieval monks frequently appear among the communicators.[1] In *More Guidance from Beyond*, given through Miss Wingfield (1925), we have the utterances of Sebastian, a monk of St Anselm's Abbey, York, "which lieth about a league to the right". He speaks in modern English, beginning, however, with "Pax vobiscum". There are echoes of *The Pilgrim's Progress*, Sunday is called "the Sabbath", and the style generally is that of a poor historical novel. Perhaps it is unfair to mention such a message, but it comes in a book which also contains teaching from a group of "Guides", who claim to give teaching of great importance.

Perhaps, too, anachronisms should be overlooked. I once read a MS describing the building of Canterbury Cathedral purporting to come from a twelfth-century monk. I said to the lady whose hand had written it automatically that the Middle Ages of the script were unlike any known to me from serious works of history, but reminded me of *The Forest Lovers*, by Maurice Hewlett—had she read that book? She replied Yes, but that was irrelevant, for the communicator could only use the images and phrases already in the mind of the writer. This would explain "Sebastian". But the value of the teaching in such cases becomes very doubtful.

II—An Example of Prediction

If knowledge of the future can be given from the next world, some may be encouraged to seek it, though the Christian will prefer to live from day to day in the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount, trusting God. The most important book under this head that I have found is Mr Bligh Bond's *The Hill of Vision : A Forecast of the Great War* (1919). He had previously published his sensational book *The Gate of Remembrance* (1918). In 1907 Mr. Bond was put in charge of the excavations at Glastonbury Abbey. His main preoccupation was to discover the lost "Edgar

[1] See the next section for Mr Bligh Bond's Glastonbury monk.

Chapel", built shortly before the Suppression. All expert opinion was against the usual place, east of the retro-choir, where it was ultimately found. He resorted to automatic writing in the hope that his subconscious self would give the results of long-continued studies. A monk took charge and gave a rough plan of the Abbey, showing the dimensions of the Chapel, which were verified almost to the inch; the remains proved to be six inches below where previous investigators had left off. Startling as this seems, it is not necessary to suppose supernatural help; much is known of medieval builders and an expert's hypothetical reconstruction *might* have proved correct.

Into the midst of these scripts broke another spirit, prophesying a catastrophe " sure and not long delayed ". In 1909 he said " war—horrid war " was impending. Similar predictions were made in July, 1911. Mr R. A. Cram, the American architect, who introduced the second book, said that no one then anticipated a breakdown of civilization. It is sufficient to recall that the Agadir crisis began in June, 1911. The controversies about the House of Lords and Ireland were acute. Strikes began in May, culminating in the great railway strike of August. A European war over Morocco was narrowly averted in that month. The older of us remember how anxious the times were. But no spirit came so near to true prediction as Professor Lake in *The Stewardship of Faith* (1913). He spoke of " a catastrophe, when the rubbish and rank luxuriance of civilization is torn up and destroyed, in order to leave the ground clear for a new harvest " (p. 15). " Society as we know it is drawing to an end. Our children will inherit a New Age: will it be an age of light or of darkness ? . . . so deep a sense of the shadow of evil things to come " (p. 180).

Mr Cram was convinced by the detailed prediction given on April 19, 1918, that the war would end on August 26, though " a semblance of war " would continue for some time. This, he says, was the actual date of the collapse of the German Army in France and of moral at home. However, H. A. L. Fisher in his *History of Europe* does not mention August 26, but gives August 8 and September 29 as the landmarks.

III—Sir William Barrett's Messages

Personality Survives Death (1937), edited by Lady Barrett, prints the messages received by her from her husband, the

distinguished scientist and pioneer in psychical research, over a number of years from 1925 onwards. We are prejudiced in their favour owing to Lady Barrett's own eminence as a scientist and because they came to her unasked. Their veridical character was proved to her incontestably by many pieces of intimate knowledge. But what is there to convince the outsider? " Life is far more wonderful than I can ever tell you, beyond anything I ever hoped " (p. 6) is common stock in such messages. On January 11, 1930, he spoke of a planet soon to be discovered, connected with Uranus. The discovery of a new planet beyond Neptune, from whose movements it had been suspected and deduced, was announced in the press on March 15. This was a good shot. He warns mankind against starchy food, says there will be no great world war, and in 1936 declares " there is bound to be trouble. . . . I do not think England will be seriously involved " (p. 148). A good old man talking like this would not attract attention and there is nothing to suggest that Sir William has added to his wisdom or knowledge since he left earth.

IV—A Philosophy of the Next World

Two delicious bits from *More Guidance from Beyond* deserve to be quoted. The group of Guides say: " Our life is one of work and business. Progression is our motto " (p. 47). And a spirit named Ernest remarks: " Humanity at large is not progressing with the same rapid strides it made some periods ago " (p. 90).

The most ambitious descriptions of the next world are contained in two works purporting to be given by F. W. H. Myers, through Miss G. Cummins, *The Road to Immortality* (1932) and *Beyond Human Personality* (1935). Sir Oliver Lodge in a foreword to the first book says that a control[1] had summoned Myers in order to give information of a specially exalted character.

There are seven planes or spheres, according to Myers:

[1] Normally, according to Spiritualist theory, there are four elements at a sitting: the medium, the sitters, the spirits, and the control, who stands in the same relation to the spirits as the medium to the sitters. The spirits impress their thoughts on the control, the control in his turn influences the unconscious mind of the medium. But often the control, having summoned a spirit, stands aside and lets him " get through " to the medium direct.

1. The plane of Matter, earthly life, out of which the soul rises at death with its astral body.

2. Hades, or the Intermediate State, where the stay is usually very brief.

3. The plane of Illusion, or the dream world, analogous to sleep on earth. The dreams are concerned with the first plane. So earthly activities are continued, such as the semblance of eating and drinking, the making of clothes by the mind, etc. The money-maker, for example, will continue his activities until he realizes that they are a sham and gets bored.[1] From the third plane many communicate with those on earth. There is peace but no progress. The inhabitants are nourished by cosmic rays. Souls which are unable to leave this plane for higher things are reincarnated. Here, too, are children waiting to be born.

4. The plane of Colour, called Eidos in the second book. Here the soul is not governed by the senses. At this stage it becomes conscious of the group-mind. From this plane higher spirits return to teach men living on earth.

5. The plane of Flame, when the soul becomes aware of the pattern its spirit is weaving. It lives on a star and goes through a time of discipline of the senses, as it burns like a flame in an emotional whirlpool.

6. The plane of White Light, when the soul obtains an intellectual conviction of all its previous existences. It lives without form, no sort of body being needed now, a pure thought of the Creator.

7. Out yonder Transcendence, when the spirit and its various souls are fused together and pass into the Supreme Mind. This is not Nirvana; we contemplate the Universe as a whole.

The general resemblance of this scheme to Theosophy is clear.[2] "Theosophy claims to be the interpreter of all religions rather than to be itself a religion" (p. 8).[3] Theosophists "accept information acknowledged to be by direct

[1] In a popular nineteenth-century book, *Letters from Hell*, translated from the Danish (1884), this conception is worked out in a powerful manner. The punishment of hell consists largely of boredom. We are compelled to repeat our worthless earthly activities, knowing them to be meaningless. To think of a thing is to have it; once possessed it is realized to be a shadow. Note that in the last century this was recognized as hell; it now becomes a lower form of bliss.

[2] Note a reference in Myers' teaching to Madame Blavatsky.

[3] This and the following references are to M. Carta Sturge, *Theosophy and Christianity*.

revelation given by certain spiritual experts who, they say, have access to facts entirely hidden from ordinary men" (p. 12). Psychics have faculties enabling them to be receptive of vibrations from the spiritual world (p. 16). There are seven divisions in the Theosophic scheme, as in Esoteric Buddhism; in both the astral body or etheric double is included (p. 24). Reincarnation takes place according to the Law of Karma.

The sources of other parts of the teaching may be pointed out. The group mind of the fourth plane—modern sociology. The children waiting to be born—Maeterlinck's *The Blue Bird*. Myers regrets that "God should have been given a masculine denomination"—feminist propaganda. The increase of population is deplored—modern forms of Malthusianism. Euthanasia is recommended—this is obvious. So is this—"I strongly advise the seeker after happiness to have a due appreciation of money."[1] The following[2] suggests Gnosticism—"Jesus was Son of God because He descended to earth, and, rising again, passed through all the seven levels of consciousness, attaining without let or hindrance to union with the Creator." That the medium was told to read the article on Buddhism in the *Harmsworth Encyclopædia* is suggestive. "Human beings . . . can only save themselves through courageous effort extending over a long period of time"[3] is popular British Pelagianism.

Fortunately we are able to trace the sources more exactly in two cases.

1. Myers, after telling Miss Cummins to read the *Harmsworth Encyclopædia* article on Astronomy, gives some farcical astronomical information. It is sufficient to quote one passage which shows how what she read was churned up in her dream-state. "Though inhabitants of the planet of war, they (the Martians) had learned to subjugate the war spirit by overcoming the evils of a superabundance of births . . . thus offering a desirable example to human beings."[4]

2. Myers identifies the astral body with the etheric body. In communications to Sir Oliver Lodge prefixed to *Beyond Human Personality* he says he is much pleased with Sir Oliver's exposition of the ether. "Each animal has a unifying invisible body made out of modified ether." "Ether is the very stuff and material of our existence here." "I prophesy

[1] *The Road to Immortality*, p. 131. [2] *Beyond Human Personality*, p. 81. [3] *Op. cit.*, p. 183. [4] *Beyond Human Personality*, p. 101.

that ten years from now the ether will have become a reality to thinking men." (This was in 1933.)

Now compare Sir Arthur Eddington in *The Nature of the Physical World*. "We postulate aether to bear the characters of the interspace as we postulate matter or electricity to bear the characters of the particles. . . . In the last century it was widely believed that aether was a kind of matter, having properties such as mass, rigidity, motion, like ordinary matter." This view is now abandoned. "Nowadays it is agreed that aether is not a kind of matter."[1]

In other words, ether is a label for interspace. That Spiritualist theory is largely based on its material character is clearly due to the connexion of Sir Oliver Lodge with the movement. Otherwise a short-lived scientific theory would not have become a dogma.

The style of the communications is considerably below that of Myers when on earth. He himself says he no longer holds the same high view of St Paul as when he wrote his famous poem.

V—"On the Edge of the Etheric"

This book by Mr J. A. Findlay was published in 1931 and by 1939 had reached the 33rd impression and had been translated into seventeen languages, including Icelandic, Arabic, and Japanese. In a sense it is the most important of the books here studied, being almost the Bible of recent Spiritualism and working out to a logical conclusion the hints of earlier books. The teaching comes through a gifted Glasgow medium, Mr J. C. Sloan. "The spirit world . . . is material, though of a substance too fine for our senses normally to appreciate" (p. 10). The etheric body is an exact duplicate of the physical counterpart. "The ether of space . . . is the substance common to both worlds", of matter and of spirit (p. 39). The etheric body has weight. In the next world there are etheric trees, animals, etc. (pp. 44-5). "Mind and matter must go together; no mind, then no matter. Thus, so long as and wherever mind exists, there must also be matter" (p. 52). Spirits, in order to materialize, have to adjust their vibrations to the conditions of earth. They draw etheric (ectoplasmic) material from the medium, and to a lesser extent

[1] Everyman's Library edition, pp. 41-2.

from the sitters, by which they build up vocal organs, a hand, or even a complete body.

According to Mr Findlay, therefore, Spiritualism *is* Materialism. Ether, which is the medium of spirit, is itself material. We are back again in the first century of our era, when spirit was supposed to be a tenuous form of matter. How materialistic Spiritualism is may be gathered from our author's remark (p. 135) that "sitting with his legs crossed is one of the first things a novice at a séance is told not to do. . . . The reason for this is to keep all the orifices of the body open, as it is through them the ectoplasm is drawn."[1]

VI—Conclusions

It is tempting to leave as open questions such puzzling problems as have been raised in this study. But some may say "You have read these books—what do *you* think?" So I give my answer.

There are two questions: (1) Is survival proved? (2) Has anything of religious value emerged? The answer to the second largely depends on the kind of answer given to the first.

1. The evidence for survival depends on intimate family details which have no cogency for outsiders, but it is so impressive in volume and variety that it ought not to be rejected. With what are we communicating? According to Spiritualists themselves, generally with minds in a somnambulist state, dreaming about earth.[2] The messages fall into line with conversations carried on with sleepwalkers, or with the secondary personalities evoked or built up by hypnotists. As to the value of this, I part company with most orthodox students of the subject. I think that much will have been gained if scientific proof is forthcoming that the mind continues to function apart from the physical body. And it seems to me that God's providence has allowed the growth of Spiritualism as an antidote to scientific materialism. It should be noted that nothing more than survival has been proved. The convincing examples are of communications from those recently dead. They are con-

[1] It is supposed to come from the medium, but the sitters give some help.

[2] Sir Oliver Lodge, *The Survival of Man*, p. 250. On p. 262 he says that the trivialities of the communications make them all the more evidential. Perhaps so, but all the less worthy claimants on our time.

sistent with the theory that, just as the body slowly returns to the earth by dissolution, so mind-stuff disintegrates only gradually.

2. Here the evidence seems quite definite. No claims have been substantiated of revelations from higher spirits who have reached a realm of knowledge beyond the stage of dreams and illusion. We are therefore at best in touch with a spirit dreaming of earth, normally communicating his thoughts through a "control", who passes them on to the unconscious mind of the medium, who reproduces them coloured by his own presuppositions and latent memories, and perhaps by telepathic receptivity from many other minds, not confined to those of the sitters. That some insight into reality *might* be gained in this way I should not care to deny. But prophets, poets, and mystics here on earth will help us far more. For practical purposes the possibility of getting material of religious value from the psychics may be disregarded.[1]

I think the line taken here will prove more useful to those who wish to warn others against Spiritualism than the usual one about survival not being eternal life. Many people cannot grasp the idea of eternal life as something different in quality from their ordinary life.

W. K. Lowther Clarke.

(*Concluded.*)

[1] The mind sometimes makes new and fruitful combinations in sleep. A volume of papers called *The Holy Eucharist*, by P. N. Waggett, ends with "Envoy: a Dream", which is far more helpful as a picture of the next world than anything I have read in psychic literature. It describes a beautiful house, a garden with gallant walks, a mystic rose symbolizing Jesus, the Presence everywhere pervading the house and garden, the flowers ringing out the name Jesus. The suggestion is that to all eternity we shall know God through Jesus and that our experience of Jesus will be in line with our present experience in Holy Communion.

Fr Waggett once told me that this was an actual dream, written down on waking. He went on to say that he once had a nightmare. He went to heaven and found it was exactly as described, gold and pearl and all. He woke up greatly disturbed and repentant of his Platonizing propensities.

The Satanic Trinity

An Interpretation of Revelation xiii

I am going to write about the Antichrist, fully aware that one must be very careful in using such words as "satanic", "demonic", and "antichristian". But if the Church herself does not dare to deal with eschatological and apocalyptic questions, especially with the biblical sayings which speak of the appearance of Antichrist in history, then the Second Adventist sects, etc., and fundamentalist schools inside the Church have a clear field for their false or exaggerated interpretations. The Church, therefore, ought to be neither reticent nor careless in using such words as "satanic", and ought never to neglect the indispensable eschatological outlook of the Gospel, especially in times of historic catastrophes. I will begin by quoting some sayings of the "cloud of witnesses", which are typical of traditional teaching. Then I will interpret the passage in the Bible which deals most significantly and extensively with the subject of Antichrist—viz., Revelation, chapter xiii.

I

First, Luther, whose soteriology always kept the balance between its personal and cosmic aspects, and who, like the teachers of the early Church, never saw the justification of man taking place without the universal victory of the realm of Christ over the realm of the devil, the world, the flesh and the law, wrote about Antichrist in his interpretation of 2 Thess. ii: "You can understand that the Antichrist will stay in the Temple—*i.e.*, in the Christian Church—as ruler and king, a preacher. There he will sit, and rise against and resist God, not intending to be above God in His majesty, but above the preached and worshipped God. That means, he will set himself higher than God, not in His majesty, but in His words—namely, that, where the Holy Spirit speaks, it is not to him the Word of God" (1539).

Reading these words of Luther, we may almost wonder whether he had not heard the rhetorical addresses of Adolf Hitler, the man to whom Luther—whose prophetic gift was not overstrong—pointed in a peculiar prophecy: "I wonder whether the Jurists will not have a Martin Luther

some time too, but I am afraid that they will get only a Thomas Muenzer."[1]

Secondly, I cite another quotation about the Antichrist from Jung Stilling's *First Supplement to the Victorious History of the Christian Religion* (1805). Stilling is describing the total reign of Antichrist, according to Dan. xi, 2; 2 Thess ii, 2; Rev. xiii. " The ' son of perdition ' will be a king, a great ruler, who reigns despotically. For he will always do what he wants to do. He will have the religion of his ancestors, namely, the Christian religion, and declare himself against it; he will issue poisoned and hostile orders against the worshipping of God, forbid Christian services, and persecute furiously the true Christians. In order to execute all this he will lay claim to the most superior spiritual power. He will avoid intercourse with the female sex, but perhaps indulge in unnatural vices. . . . He will not have any Faith. . . . But the God of the fortresses will be the idol he will worship. For he will be a soldier by profession because he wants to protect himself by force and to subdue all by force. Nothing, therefore, will be more valuable in his view than a good soldier. Above all, he will claim to be right in all things."

Thirdly, following a very old genealogical tree of Antichrist—reproduced in Luther's Table-talk—we find at the end of a long list of vices and depravities which are given as Antichrist's alleged ancestry the following: " terrors begat anarchy; anarchy begat fear; fear begat questioning; questioning begat guesses at truth by which is revealed him who is called Antichrist." These strange and primitive words emphatically assert that the origin of Antichrist is to be sought exclusively in the spiritual world.

Fourthly, where there is a convulsing outburst of Antichristianity, then Antichrist himself is revealed to men through the prophetic gift of Christ's Church. Vilmar, the great Lutheran theologian of the last century, wrote in 1848, when speaking to the senior pupils of a grammar school of which he was headmaster:

" What political future lies before us and before you, I am able to decide as little as anyone on earth. The future to which

[1] Thomas Muenzer was the first leader of the Anabaptists and a Christian rioter at the time of the Reformation, and was killed in the Peasants' War in 1525. The Nazis have erected a monument to him in his town, Muehlhausen in Thuringia, and like to call him the first National Socialist.

I can and must point you, is the future of the Church. Her epoch has begun. The period of the last and mightiest struggles against blasphemy and seduction, the epoch of the last and severest temptations, has begun, and the moment of a separation is approaching. It is possible that several centuries are ordained for this by God the Father—I do not know that—but I know that the time is here, and the Church will not stand these temptations and struggles, and will not become a Catholic Holy saving Church on earth, unless she is filled with knowledge of the second coming of her Head and Lord, and ever waits for Him." And again: "The consequence is that unless we are bound to the Creeds of the Church in our conscience, we shall be like small boys, infantile children, or even enemies of the Church. . . . Apostasy from this knowledge (of the Creeds) does not lead *backward*, as is usually said, to *Paganism*, but *forward to Anti-christianity*" (Chr. Vilmar, *Christian Dogmatics*, 1856 ff.).

Finally, here is a quotation from a recent interpretation of Rev. xiii, which is also the subject of the present essay:

World History is always itself World Judgment: not indeed in the sense that World History itself can judge and decide. World History is as little actually able to make as it is able to correct the decisions of God. But World History is in truth World Judgment in so far as the wrath of God is revealed in, with and under its assistance, and, consequently, something of the fury of "the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God" (Rom. ii, 5) is effective.[1]

World history is full of signs. We ought to interpret the signs by the Scriptures, but not the Scriptures by the signs (which is what the heretics, ancient and modern, like to do, and what liberal critical theology has frivolously imputed to the Evangelists).

II

The only right point of view for an interpretation of the eschatological texts of Scripture is that of the Word of God's judgment all over the world. For *He* has the "keys of hell and death" (Rev. i, 18). We can look at the future only from the standpoint of a universal judgment of God over all men. Each single revelation of God's wrath, each of the seven trumpets of the angels, each of the seven vials full of wrath, brings us nearer to the New Heaven and the

[1] H. Schlier, in the festival gift for Karl Barth on his fiftieth birthday, 1936; we all in the Confessional Church have been indebted to this essay.

New Earth. Believers themselves stand under the judgment, yet they know that salvation is the reverse side of the judgment. The eschatological condemnations will guide us straight to the last word of the Scriptures: " Surely I come quickly."

In this movement towards the fullness of the Kingdom of Grace, towards the victory of Christ, the person of Antichrist plays an important and peculiar rôle. The Book of Revelation speaks of a last period not as a general idea but with reference to actual history, contemporary or future. The book starts with the empirical church, that of the seven congregations mentioned in chapters ii and iii, congregations which are typical of Christianity at any time, as it approaches the last time. On the other hand, chapters xiv-xxi are filled with the post-historic events of the last days themselves. Intercalated between the empirical churches and the last days are the events which occur with respect to Antichrist, whose period is doubtless thought to be an historic period—namely, the last time before the last time. Its duration is fixed, namely, " a thousand two hundred and threescore days " — *i.e.*, forty-two months. For such a period Antichrist is understood to appear on earth and to reign over the earth.

After the twelfth chapter has spoken of the wife (*i.e.*, the Church) and of the dragon (*i.e.*, an embodiment of the devil and the great adversary of the wife), the thirteenth chapter tells of two beasts behind whom that dragon stands.

> And I stood upon the sand of the sea, and saw a beast rise up out of the sea, having seven heads and ten horns, and upon his horns ten crowns, and upon his heads the name of blasphemy. And the beast which I saw was like unto a leopard, and his feet were as the feet of a bear, and his mouth as the mouth of a lion; and the dragon gave him his power, and his seat, and great authority. And I saw one of his heads as it were wounded to death; and his deadly wound was healed; and all the world wondered after the beast. And they worshipped the dragon which gave power unto the beast, and they worshipped the beast, saying, Who is like unto the beast ? who is able to make war with him ? And there was given unto him a mouth speaking great things and blasphemies; and power was given unto him to continue forty and two months. And he opened his mouth in blasphemy against God, to blaspheme His name, and His tabernacle, and them that dwell in heaven. And it was given unto him to make war with the saints, and to overcome them;

and power was given him over all kindreds, and tongues, and nations.

Thus, first we have the *dragon* and the *first beast*. The dragon, Bengel says, is the "principal", the beast the "vassal". The power of the first beast is given to him by the dragon. The first beast represents the power of hell, embodied on earth. His head is mortally wounded, but healed; he seems to be immortal like the Saviour—*i.e.*, living, though dying. His work is blasphemy and warfare against the saints. His success is that all those who worship the dragon also worship him and sigh passionately: "Who is like unto the beast? who is able to make war with him?" In this way hirelings and heretics try to adapt the old biblical words of worshipping and preaching to a new worshipping of the beast and a new preaching on him.

Here we have clearly entered the sphere of *Antichrist* and *Antichristianity*, and

all that dwell upon the earth shall worship the beast, whose names are not written in the book of life of the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world. If any man have an ear, let him hear. He that leadeth into captivity shall go into captivity; he that killeth with the sword must be killed with the sword. Here is the patience and the faith of the saints.

The first beast, recognized as tempter and seducer by the might of his force, represents the *devil made man*, the second personality of the "satanic trinity", as Jung Stilling has called the dragon and the two beasts.

Then, to the first beast and to his rule on earth the Book of Revelation adds still another beast. This second beast is said to be like the Lamb, the Reconciler, although he speaks like the dragon, and he is understood to succeed in making all the world worship the first beast.

And I beheld another beast coming up out of the earth; and he had two horns like a lamb, and he spake as a dragon. And he exerciseth all the power of the first beast before him, and causeth the earth and them which dwell therein to worship the first beast, whose deadly wound was healed. And he doeth great wonders, so that he maketh fire come down from heaven on the earth in the sight of men, and deceiveth them that dwell on the earth by means of those miracles which he had power to do in the sight of the beast; saying to them that dwell on the earth, that they should make an image to the beast, which had the wound by a sword, and did live.

This second beast is, as it were, the third person in the satanic trinity—*i.e.*, the spirit of hell. His relation to the first beast corresponds to the relation between Christ and the Holy Ghost. His first deeds are his miracles by which he seduces all people on earth,[1] and the beast accomplishes his miracles by causing people to make an image of the first beast to be worshipped. In this way a new religion, a new church, is brought into being by the second beast. The spirit of hell founds the church of the devil on earth. Just as the Holy Ghost is called by the Nicene Creed " the giver of life ", so the second beast is said to have " power to give life unto the image of the beast ". All interpreters agree that in the second beast is concentrated the power of all wrong prophecy. He is the chief agent of the mighty first beast; yet he looks innocuous, even resembles Christ Himself. He is the master of " Weltanschauung " and " Propaganda ", for " he exerciseth all the power of the first beast before him ". One might say that the second beast deserves in a special sense to be called Antichrist, but this name belongs in a more general sense to the whole trinitarian unity of the two beasts with the dragon.

The great interpreter of the Book of Revelation, Johann Bengel, wrote in the eighteenth century about the second beast: " He will assume the pretended virtue and wisdom which is practised by many a man—singly as well as socially —without God's Word, without a Redeemer and a Comforter; he is not afraid either of Deism, or of Socinianism, or of Pelagianism "—we should speak to-day of Liberalism, Unitarianism, Humanism—" he abuses the doctrine of the inward Word, and mixes easily Christianity with Islam." Karl Barth, as well as others, have called the Nazi religion " the new Islam ".

The new religion and the new church develop finally into a new politics, an ecclesiastical politics, so to speak, and there are immense and formidable consequences of the foundation of a church of the satanic trinity, consequences in the daily life of society:

> [The second beast] had power to give life unto the image of the beast, that the image of the beast should both speak, and cause that as many as would not worship the image of the beast should be killed. And he causeth all, both small and great,

[1] The Swedish novel *The Miracles of the Antichrist*, by Selma Lagerloef, is worthy of mention in this connexion.

rich and poor, free and bond, to receive a mark in their right hand, or in the foreheads: and that no man might buy or sell, save he that had the mark, or the name of the beast, or the number of his name.

These words teach us in what way the political priesthood of the satanic trinity reaches its aim, step by step.

The first step is that the image of the first beast becomes living by the action of the second beast. His gift of false prophecy has the power of spiritualizing the dark powers and making them most attractive, seductive and seducing. The image becomes so powerful that it is able to speak as well as to persecute and to kill all who do not believe in the satanic trinity. It is significant that the persecuted people are not thought to be only Christians; the political priesthood no longer acknowledges so-called neutral people. The realm of the satanic trinity is total tyranny without any freedom.

The second step follows: the image of the first beast will be used as a state-political instrument becoming a mark by which all people are to be marked, " both small and great, rich and poor, free and bond ". Those who are not marked are immediately unveiled as " enemies Nos. 1, 2, 3, etc.," while each one who is marked is forced in this way to live as a worshipper and follower of the satanic trinity.

But even this step is not yet the last one. Verse 17 shows how the might of the dragon and of the two beasts will go far beyond the borders of their proper spheres; it invades every part of private, as well as of public, life. For nobody is allowed to buy or to sell who does not have the name of the beast or his number. He who does not accept the mark of Antichrist threatens the totalitarian realm and is instantly cast out. The followers of the beasts are slaves, and a slave needs to wear a mark to be identified by his proprietor. Life in the realm of Antichrist, under the satanic trinity, is a pseudo-sacramental life; H. Schlier rightly compares the mark of the beast with the Sacrament of Baptism in Christianity.

God is never consistent in the strict sense of this word, for God is *Love*. But the devil is consistent indeed, and nowhere in the world is there to be found any institution so consistent as the totalitarian Church-State of the satanic trinity. What the devilish consistency of " Jus Canonicum " meant at the time of Luther, his forerunners and his successors, the consistency, still more mightily developed, of

" the New Order ", under which people must wear the mark of Antichrist to be admitted to work for their daily bread, means now.

But what is really written in the mark of the beast? what can be really read on the right hands and the foreheads of his believers? The answer is given in the last verse of Rev. xiii : " Here is wisdom. Let him that hath understanding count the number of the beast; for it is the number of a man; and his number is Six hundred three score and six." *It is the number of a man.* The man may change at times, but the number remains always the mark of a man, and is never that of a spirit. The number, which is the mark, may be obscure for many, but there is much plausibility in the suggestion, testified by learned scholars (like Deissmann), confirmed by theological interpretation of the Scriptures and by some of the cloud of witnesses, that the number signifies:

KAISAR THEOS (Emperor God).

When the day of the second coming of Christ has come nearer, and the sixth angel has poured out his vial full of wrath, then, St John says, " I saw three unclean spirits like frogs come out of the mouth of the dragon, and out of the mouth of the beast and out of the mouth of the false prophet " —as the second beast can be called after the realm of the satanic trinity has begun to decline—" for they are the spirits of devils, working miracles, which go forth unto the kings of the earth and of the whole world, to gather them to the battle of that great day of God Almighty " (xvi, 13, 14). When that battle comes the satanic trinity will have no further resources; and, in this battle of the great day of God Almighty, the two beasts " were cast alive into a lake of fire burning with brimstone " (xix, 20). The final victory of the Holy Trinity over the satanic trinity is revealed by the Gospel of the Lamb of God, and St John " saw thrones, and they sat upon them, and judgment was given unto them . . . which had not worshipped the beast . . . neither had received his mark upon their foreheads, or in their hands; and they lived and reigned with Christ . . . " (xx, 4).

Hans Ehrenberg.

Note.—Readers may be interested to compare what Dante says about the three faces of Lucifer, *Div. Com.*, *Inferno*, xxxiv.

Gilbert Keith Chesterton

I—The Challenge of the Age

When the history of Christianity in the twentieth century is written, there can be little doubt that an important place will be allotted to G. K. Chesterton. The reasons for his significance will, however, be less apparent. So far his interpreters have viewed him as an artist rather than as a theologian or as a philosopher. Thus Mr Waring has observed: "it is as an artist—and not as a democrat, a reformer or a Catholic—that G. K. C. achieved his most lasting fame".[1] On the other hand Mr Gerald Bullett says that "he is not a great artist because he is not a great creator"[2]; whilst a further writer affirms that "he is always the journalist, writing for the day only".[3] Although all these opinions have a grain of truth in them, they do not represent the final standpoint. Yet another interpreter, M. Emile Cammaerts, gets very much closer to the bull's eye when he observes that Chesterton was really a prophet:

> Although he would have shunned the word, he felt that he had a message to deliver, and he made it his business to deliver it in a thousand ways. The same ideas reappear in his criticisms, his poems, his novels, his biographies, even in his detective stories. They cannot be found in any particular volume, they are scattered through a whole library and assume the most varied forms. But they all turn round the same central light like moths round a candle, the light of a genuine and vivid faith.[4]

Here we are very much nearer the truth, for Chesterton has a very eminent place in the rehabilitation of Christian thought and laughter at the beginning of this century. It is important, therefore, to examine the twin bases upon which Chesterton's "theology" rested, the bases which are in themselves a challenge and a response, the reaction to the age in which he was educated and the age in which he was living, and the response to that reaction.

Thus Chesterton's first importance—and this is of interest in an age when artistic forms are generally either sterile or

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[1] *Fortnightly Review*, November, 1937, 593. [2] G. Bullett, *The Innocence of G. K. Chesterton* (1923), 146. [3] Julius West, *G. K. Chesterton* (1915), 81. [4] E. Cammaerts, *The Laughing Prophet* (1937), 15.

revolutionary—is as a rebel.[1] "Christianity," he says, "alone has felt that God, to be wholly God, must have been a rebel as well as a king."[2] This partly indicates the position that Chesterton has in the Neo-Romantic movement, for as an eminent critic has said, "the classical writer feels himself to be a member of an organized society. . . . The Romantic is in rebellion against external law. . . . He asserts the right of his individuality *contra mundum*."[3] This attitude of "rebellion" is one of the most significant factors in Chesterton's life because it conditioned his whole approach to the problems by which the world was beset. His interest in Charles Dickens and Robert Louis Stevenson, in St Francis and St Thomas Aquinas, was not so much literary-historical as political; he perceived the light of "revolt" burning in his two heroes. His appreciation of William Cobbett and his failure to understand Chaucer rest on the same basis.[4] He notes that in the *Chimes* Dickens "hurled himself with even more than his usual militant joy and scorn into an attack upon a cant which made his blood boil."[5] Dickens was continually attacking those things which in other forms Chesterton himself was to attack —the low standard of education and schools in Dotheboys Hall, the court of Chancery in *Bleak House*, the evils of the nursing system in *Martin Chuzzlewit*. Yet the bright light of optimism burnt above the general gloom. "His poor man is always Mark Tapley, a man the optimism of whose spirit increases if anything with the pessimism of his experience."[6] Similarly Chesterton was attracted to Robert Browning because the "optimism" of his poetry was founded upon "life which was the work of God . . . upon joyful experience".[7] Again and again his work emphasizes that he was a radical ever eager to change the course of human life and—this suggests the conservative nature of his radicalism—to redirect its energies towards the life that he was convinced belonged to God. In this revolt itself, however

[1] "I never could join the young men of my time in feeling what they called the general sentiment of revolt" (*Autobiography*, 100). Yet his whole life was inspired by a general "sentiment of revolt", not, indeed, against the Natural and Divine Law towards anarchy but from the external lawlessness towards the Natural and Divine Law. *Cf. Orthodoxy*, 201; *St Thomas Aquinas*, 48; *Evils of Eugenics*, 21.
[2] *Orthodoxy*, 254. [3] J. Middleton Murry, *The Problem of Style*, 146.
[4] *Vide William Cobbett* (1925), *Chaucer* (1932). [5] *Dickens*, 171.
[6] *Id.*, 177. [7] *Browning*, 180.

diverse and contradictory its characteristics, Chesterton was at one with other writers of the century with whom at first sight he had not the slightest sympathy. Indeed, Myaslavsky and Stravinsky are as typical of it as Epstein, Griz, and Picasso. Perhaps Samuel Butler symbolizes the destructive force of the new attitude most clearly in the *Way of All Flesh*, published in 1903. This certainly reveals the many coloured strands of failing power, how the parents of his hero had failed to crush the will of their son, how religion had become the sinister will of a respectable despot, an excuse for punishment, in the same way as education had become an excuse for hypocrisy and deceit, and duty a means of forbidding him to do everything which his healthy instincts desired. Thomas Hardy, representing the evolutionist standpoint in his *Dynasts*, a long epic poem dealing with the Napoleonic wars, was yet another figure trampling with the hoofs of time upon the recumbent body of a dying epoch. Wells' spectacular dashes for freedom, which caught the atmosphere of the important period of transition so well, Galsworthy's description of the life of the wealthy upper middle class as portrayed in *Forsyte Saga*, and Arnold Bennett's portrayal of the provincials of the Midlands, all display the cleavage of which Chesterton was not the least remarkable representative. For although he could not sympathize with the aims of his fellow-rebels, and indeed denied that he was a rebel, his own reaction is as clearly posed, in his *Napoleon of Notting Hill*, in his portraits of Auberon Quin and Adam Wayne. In his *Browning* he had emphasized that Sludge, Prince Hohenstiel-Schwangau, and Bishop Blougram were all types of Browning's particular apologetic. Similarly Adam Wayne is the lineal type of nearly all Chesterton's heroes, from the innkeeper in the *Flying Inn* to Gabriel Gale and Father Brown, from Dickens to St Francis and R. L. S. He stands sword in hand, defending that fantastic suburb of Notting Hill against due and legal authority as a rebel and like all rebels confident of his own right:

> Nicaragua has been conquered like Athens. Nicaragua has been annexed like Jerusalem. The Yankee and the German and the brute powers of modernity have trampled it with the hoof of oxen. But Nicaragua is not dead. Nicaragua is an idea. . . . Wherever there is a field of marigolds and the red cloak of an old woman, there is Nicaragua. . . . Wherever I see a red pillar box and a yellow sunset, there my heart beats. Blood and a splash of mustard can be my heraldry. If there be

yellow mud and red mud in the same ditch it is better than white stars.[1]

In the intensity of Juan del Fuego's idealism there breathed a spirit no less ardent than that of his creator, Chesterton. In the footsteps of the prophets, of Elijah and Amos, Isaiah and Habakkuk, he stood against an advancing foe until even in the war days of 1941 it may be possible to say that that foe is beginning to retreat. If that is so, Chesterton must have some of the credit for it. Chesterton was fighting against two foes—the domestic contentment and ironical self-complacency of the Victorian era and the trenchant reaction and drab materialism of Georgian England. When we have understood the challenge which these two forces, both of them in one sense forming a synthesis and yet so far as Chesterton's reaction was concerned needing an analysis, we shall have comprehended one of the bases of Chesterton's opinions and ideas and have seen the way prepared for the response, the determined response, of the Christian faith.

Although the Victorian era has been pilloried by historians and writers, it had, in fact, an amplitude and a force which cannot but arouse admiration and which points to its true greatness. Chesterton himself realized the nobility of the age which educated him. The middle class, although dangerously " deaf and blind upon the question of economic exploitation . . . was relatively more vigilant and sensitive upon the question of financial decency."[2] Yet he perceived, even as early as *Greybeards at Play*, that the Victorians had ceased to wonder in the way that a child wonders. For a child is always asking questions—why the sun is hot, and why the rain is wet, why haddocks are flat and sausages called dogs; but the Victorian age, as far as the last decades were concerned, had forgotten to ask questions because it thought it had all the answers. Even Herbert Spencer's agnosticism was touched with complacency. " The years from 1889 to 1898 ", Chesterton wrote, " were like the hours of afternoon in a rich house before teatime. They believed in nothing except good manners, and the essence of good manners is to conceal a yawn." Thus even when he was defending the Victorians, he could not forget that he disliked their era:

> The change may be felt, as in the word " respectable ", in the very atmosphere of certain words. The favourite modern

[1] *Napoleon of Notting Hill*, 56-7. [2] *Autobiography*, 25.

ideal in morals and even in religion is the word "adventure". The most menacing monster in morals, for the business man, of my middle class was branded with the title of adventurer.[1]

Although he was defending respectability, he would never have defended it at the cost of adventurous spirit, for what he wanted might be termed the "adventure of respectability". He attacks this feeling of domestic self-contentment in *Heretics* and *Orthodoxy*, whilst in a much later volume of essays he defends Kenelm Digby's *Broadstone of Honour* against the sneers of Lord Macaulay, and he goes on to say:

> Is it for the rich of the nineteenth century to talk of the inhumanity of the Middle Ages? In order that the children of pleasure may not be incommoded by the sight of poverty the poor are shut up within high walls, and condemned for the crimes of being poor and miserable.[2]

Squeaky black boots, tall gaunt houses, "Gothic" churches, rice puddings and aspidistras, worship of Mr Gladstone and hatred of the Boer, all combined to create what has still not unjustifiably been called the greatest age in history. "The country" regarded itself, says Mr R. C. K. Ensor, "as the workshop of the world"—a phrase which expressed not an aspiration but a fact. It was only natural that Chesterton, brought up in such an environment—although, as he confesses, he was lucky in his own family—should come into conflict with what was a failing order of society whose ethics and theology were wearing thin throughout. Perhaps Chesterton took most objection to the industrial materialism of the age, the "mammonic" God typified by the new iron ships, the *Great Eastern* and the *Collingwood*. One of the ways in which he reacted against this great grey god was escapist, the escape into fantasy, into that toy theatre which exercised so hypnotic a fascination over him from his earliest days.[3] Speaking of Celtic literature, he himself said that the dominant passion of the artistic Celt, particularly W. B. Yeats and Burne-Jones, "lies in the word 'escape', escape into a land where oranges grow on plum trees and men can sow what they like and reap what they enjoy."[4] This "reality of fantasy", perhaps the most typical note of his

[1] *Id.*, 23. [2] *Well and Shadows*, 218.

[3] Chesterton discusses the significance of the Toy theatre in his *Autobiography*, 49, but the explanation seems self-deceptive. *Vide* also: *O'Connor*, 78; *Dickens*, 61, 122; *The Resurrection of Rome*, 182; and essay on the "Toy Theatres" in *Tremendous Trifles*. [4] *G. F. Watts.*

early revolt, is seen hovering in the *Napoleon of Notting Hill*, supremely triumphant in the allegorical person of " Sunday " in the *Man Who was Thursday* and in the challenge of *Orthodoxy*. But it was not yet formed into a dominant philosophy, only had the vague atmosphere of revolt, based primarily on divine discontent, on fairy kings and robber barons, suburban Napoleons and divine anarchists, which acted perhaps as a relief to the satisfaction engendered by the rate of Consols or a warlike gesture in South Africa. He attacked this self-content, then, not only because it savoured of the most grievous of all the seven sins, pride, *superbia*, but also and more fundamentally because its basis was material rather than spiritual, a " golden " heart in the metallic and Midean sense of the word. He recognized the tremendous force of the industrial revolution, but he thought that it had generated more evil than good. Again, although he appreciated the benefits bestowed by and the significance of the Oxford Movement, with whose leaders he was much in sympathy, he saw that the majority of people had an " industrial ", almost a cash-nexus, approach to religion. In his *Autobiography*, he relates how a friend of his grandfather used to walk about on Sunday with a prayer book in hand without the least intention of entering a church, merely " pour encourager les autres ". But Chesterton adjudged the depths of the evil mainly by its manifestations in political and economic life.

In the former he saw what he regarded as the worship of a false God, anarchic and bureaucratic constitutionalism:

> The evil power which buttressed privilege
> And went with women and champagne and bridge
> Broke—and Democracy resumed her reign
> Which went with bridge and women and champagne.

The " caucus " system of party politics, which was one of the salient features of later nineteenth-century political life, marked for Chesterton the triumph of a corruption which the Reform Bill of 1832 had furthered rather than impeded. It would not be untrue to say that for Chesterton every election had the characteristics of the " Eatanswill " by-election without the mirth and joy attached to that glorious farce.

In economic life he saw the rise of a class of big men, the Sir Daniel Goochs and the Rockefellers, whose sole aim,

at least on the surface, was the gratification of their material desires.

This self-complacency and selfish ambition invaded literature as well and found its classic fulfilment in many a pamphlet and sermon. An example may be found in Shepherd's *School of Pantagruel*. It is just the sort of work which Chesterton with his deep love of man in the heights and in the dim depths would have most deprecated. The author's aim—he is writing in 1862—is to purge the libraries "public and private" of "pollutions in literature", and in order to do this he excludes half the great works of the last three centuries. He has no feeling for the historical content of Rabelais' great work and denounces him as an intellectual scavenger wallowing in the miry ways of literature. On the other hand he admits English literature before 1650, including "our own sweet Chaucer" on the grounds that any coarse language or immoral comment is excusable "as only the warmth of a rich imagination". Smollett, however, "never rises and seeks not to rise from the slough of filth in which he wallows," whilst the readers of *Tom Jones* and of Fielding's other novels must in any case "be confined to the male sex". In conclusion he compares Tennyson to St Paul and congratulates his own age on its standard of morality, both in life and literature. This slight and unimportant work reveals, then, that complacency and self-satisfaction which no admirer of the Victorian age can deny and against which Chesterton first reacted.

But the "first" reaction was rather like a disembodied spirit, a house without a foundation or a rebel without a purpose. He found no philosophy in the Slade School of Art. The purpose and the philosophy were the result of the second, more potent revolt. It was the union of these two fundamentals, these two tendencies, which formed the basis of the philosophic outlook and literary material of the mature Chesterton. If it can be said that the Industrial Revolution had a "material" soul, the new age, so Chesterton thought, had no soul at all. Art fell a victim first, not to the real revival as seen in the work of William Morris or in the beginning of the Promenade Concerts, but to a decadent exoticism which was partly caused by French defeatism following the Franco-Prussian war, and which had its chief prophets in Oscar Wilde and Aubrey Beardsley, and its most damning defect in its insincerity. There was not, indeed, any "concrete" feature against which he reacted,

but the general atmosphere of licence without liberty, of pleasure without jollity, of life without God. In one of his poems in the *White Knight* he reproached the sins of the age:

> There is one sin: to call a green leaf grey,
> Whereat the sun in heaven shuddereth.
> There is one blasphemy: for death to pray,
> For God alone knoweth the praise of death.
>
> There is one creed: 'neath no world-terror's wing
> Apples forget to grow on apple trees.
> There is one thing needful—everything—
> The rest is vanity of vanities.[1]

It was the grey world of Edward VII and George V, the shivering and dim light of perpetual evening where the apricot of the birds has gone and all is sombre and dripping. The hills have no shape because of the mist and even the chimneys have lost their outline, for the goal is uncertain and unreal. But for Chesterton " creation wore a coat covered with heraldic animals in red and gold and on his chest a man rampant. He lay back in his chair with a broad smile, the picture of an optimist in his element."[2]

A cloud was on the mind of man and wailing went the weather,
Yea, a sick cloud upon the soul when we were boys together,
Science announced nonentity, and art admired decay;
The world was old and ended; but you and I were gay.

Chesterton had discovered both a philosophy and a vocation. In a criticism of Ibsen's play *John Gabriel Borkman* he asserted that it was a play with great possibilities which had failed because none of the characters had a religious or inner life. This was also his commentary on the twentieth century. " The hermit rolling on the stones in a frenzy of submission is a healthier person fundamentally than many a sober man who is walking down Cheapside."[3] A philosophy of life must have a sure basis whether in reason and/or faith and it must work according to rule; the opposite of an ordered man is an anarchist, and a " silent anarchy is eating out our society ".[4] The last years of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the present century had lost both faith and reason, so that the " gubernatores " of the

[1] *Collected Poems*, 326. [2] *Man Who was Thursday* (Penguin Series), 247. [3] *Heretics*, 26. [4] *Evils of Eugenics*, 22.

century were sailing over seemingly uncharted seas. But they had not really lost their navigating instruments. They had only failed to find them, and that was the most hideous part of it, for the ship was going on the rocks when it could have been saved. Of course Chesterton's views are exaggerated, but to him exaggeration was of the essence of true art.[1] There was, too, more to the last decades of the nineteenth century than the nihilism of the Yellow Book; Henry Irving and Ellen Terry in drama, the writing of *Heretics* itself, show that there was gold among the mud. Yet Chesterton's main thesis that the age was—and indeed is—rudderless, especially in matters of religion, is on the whole indisputable. Against the microcosm of the new God, Mammon (the rich man), stands the microcosm of the true God, the poor man. "Trade is all very well in its way, but Trade has been put in the place of Truth. They have taken what the ancient philosophers called the Good, and translated it into the Goods."[2] The age in which he lived presented, then, a twofold challenge, a challenge so fundamental in its nature that Chesterton's whole life was spent in developing and living the response. The response to the negation of the agnostic was found in the Christian Gospel.

V. H. H. Green.

(*To be concluded.*)

[1] "Exaggeration is a definition of art" (*Dickens*, 18).
[2] *Well and Shadows*, 222.

MISCELLANEA

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REVISED REVIEWS—VI

THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY. By John Henry Cardinal Newman.

A re-review of this famous book is apt at the present time, owing to the fact that circumstances (ninety years after its publication) are reopening many controversies about education which it had been imagined had been once for all settled in the intervening period. The main portions of the original book have recently been published in the Everyman Library, No. 723, for 2s. 6d., which will make the thoughts of Newman easily available. It contains eight discourses of the 1852 book and the lecture on "Christianity and Scientific Investigation" which was addressed "to the members of the Catholic University in Dublin" in 1855; the other special lectures to faculties are omitted. It will be best to review this recent publication, and the pages given are from the Everyman edition. Of course there are occasional remarks which are of a controversial nature —*e.g.*, some of his strictures on Protestantism; these we will pass over, for we are now concerned with educational problems, which concern the unity and stability of our society to-day, and it is for this reason that the book is being reviewed.

As is well known, Newman wrote these discourses at a time when he had come to fear that obscurantism might drive from Roman Catholics in Ireland a proper respect for a liberal education; he wished to escape from a situation in which the Church would find itself over against a culture which was dissolving into suicidal fragmentariness, while having no proper inner relation to the life of universities from which the Church might exercise any helpful influence. He hoped that a university might be formed in which a steady growth towards all kinds of truth might be obtained by the corporate criticism of experts in all departments of knowledge and in which the in-

fluence of theology might do something to prevent faculties from splitting up into antagonistic specialisms. The effect of a lack of unity in universities would be the spread of a shallow " viewiness " (Preface, 43) instead of the real " formation and cultivation of the mind, properly trained to have a connected view or grasp of things ", and he held that this could only be prevented by a liberal and all-round education in constant touch with both philosophy and theology.

In the first discourse Newman is at pains to insist that theology is a branch of knowledge and argues that by now we should be able to get further than a system of " mixed education " in which theology and other sciences are taught in separate institutions. He argues that to fail to make provision for the teaching of theology in universities is to contradict the very nature of a university by destroying the principle of its combination—namely, that it claims to teach universal knowledge. This argument is not invalidated by the fact that divine truth differs in kind from human truths, for human studies differ from each other. " You will soon break up into fragments the whole circle of secular knowledge if you begin with mutilation of the divine " (17). He admits that if religion has no connexion with reason and is a mere matter of taste and sentiment then his argument would not hold; but once admit the existence of God or still more the truth of the Incarnation and his conclusion follows that " Religious doctrine is knowledge in as full a sense as Newton's doctrine is knowledge; University education without Theology is simply unphilosophical " (33).

In the second discourse he proceeds to argue that the omission of theology from a university is not only indefensible in itself but would be prejudicial to all the rest of the sciences. He argues that all the individual sciences are abstractions, which deal rather with the relations between things than with things themselves; they are true as far as they go, but by themselves they are partial and separate. If we do not deal with the whole of man and obtain some hierarchical conception of the manifold relations in which he stands, we shall not be dealing with anything concrete (41). Devotees of any science to the exclusion of all others necessarily become " bigots and quacks " who scorn all principles and facts which do not belong to their own specialism. In other words, a university cannot escape the task of seeking for a science of the sciences—*i.e.*, a philosophy. Even theology would be subject to the same criticism if it were pursued in abstraction from all the other sciences (43). All the sciences need each other and man is inevitably a philosopher, who will make a philosophy out of some special science with disastrous results. Thus the ignoring of the mind and will of man through the study of the physical and mechanical sciences will soon avenge itself; still more is this so if the divine agency is ignored. He would not allow any science to escape from the

responsibility for chaos when it is applied to human life in this one-sided way. Thus he concludes that to withdraw theology or any science from the circle of university instruction will not only impair the completeness but will invalidate the trustworthiness of all that is actually taught.

In the third discourse the bearing of other branches of knowledge on theology is considered. He has reached the position that revelation may be viewed as one of the constituent parts of human knowledge considered as a whole and that if you drop any science out of the circle of knowledge other sciences at once close up and exceed their proper bounds and intrude where they have no right or capacity (64). He now argues that any science will fall largely into error if it be the sole exponent of all things in heaven and earth; in particular if religion is not strong on its own ground and does not take its proper place in education, then partial sciences will soon claim the kind of devotion which is only to be given to God; thus exclusive lines of study will inevitably produce social disintegration. He gives several examples of this in detail. His remarks about the usurpations of political economy are specially apt. A science of wealth gives rules for gaining and disposing of wealth, but it cannot by itself declare that its end is not the ultimate end of all things; if there is no other science of a more comprehensive character, the pursuit of wealth establishes itself as the end of life, with disastrous consequences, as such a theory is against the essential nature of man. Newman also says that it is possible to use theology out of its place: " Experimentalists would be sure to cry out if I attempted to install the Thomist philosophy in the schools of astronomy or medicine " (88).

In the fourth discourse the proposition is stated that liberal knowledge is its own end, and to some this chapter may be the most important in the book. Newman takes it for granted that for the sake of both students and professors the range of university studies should be as wide as possible, and he insists that everyone is capable of profiting from contact with an intellectual tradition and of apprehending the great outlines of knowledge or of forming a " philosophical habit ", which shows itself in freedom, equitableness, calmness, moderation, and wisdom (93). Then the question arises—" Will practical objects be attained better or worse by this cultivation ?" He answers that the end cannot be divided from that knowledge itself which is called by him liberal; that the special philosophy which gives some comprehensive view of truth in all its branches satisfies a direct need of human nature in its very acquisition, and he does not discuss the worth of such an acquirement as compared with wealth, power, comfort, honour, except that he says that no education can be satisfactory which confuses means and ends. He recognizes that liberal knowledge can be acquired in the most utilitarian studies but insists that the

main point is that behind the acquisition of every specialism there should always be a background of liberal knowledge sought for its own sake. Thus he will not agree with those who contrast a commercial or professional education with a liberal education; in fine "that alone is liberal knowledge, which stands on its own pretensions, is independent of sequel and expects no complement in order to present itself to our contemplation" (99); thus the most ordinary pursuits can have this specific character, while the highest pursuits can lose it when they minister to something beyond them (*e.g.*, if theology is limited to the purposes of the pulpit, it becomes an art making use of theology). Thus liberal knowledge can be its own end; prior to its being a power, it is a good in itself—*i.e.*, it is "something intellectual, which grasps what it perceives through the senses, which takes a view of things, which reasons upon what it sees and while it sees and which invests it with an idea" (104). It is this teaching of liberal knowledge which makes a university rather a place of education than a place of instruction; it confers this "inward endowment of illumination" as a habit and life-long possession, for it implies a formation of our mental nature; but it is equally important in Newman's view that we should not fancy that such liberal knowledge is the producer of virtue or religion on the one hand or of any mechanical utility on the other—*e.g.*, "taken by itself it as little mends our hearts as it improves our temporal circumstances" (111); "good sense is not conscience, refinement is not humility nor is largeness and justness of view faith" (112). In fine, liberal education is simply the cultivation of the intellect as such and its object is nothing more or less than intellectual excellence, and this is an object as intelligible as the cultivation of virtue.

In the fifth discourse Newman proceeds to view this liberal knowledge in relation to learning and this in three directions: (*a*) to mere knowledge or learning, (*b*) to professional knowledge, and (*c*) to religious knowledge. He insists that a university is not a place for acquiring passively a great deal of knowledge on a great many subjects; of course there is no true culture without acquirements, and philosophy presupposes some knowledge, for without some knowledge no expansion of the mind is possible. Yet the end of the liberal education is not mere knowledge considered in its matter, for the simple reason that there is no enlargement of the mind without the action of a formative force which can reduce to order and meaning the matter of the information acquired. Mere attainments and narrowness of mind can well go together, and information can be received in a passive, otiose, and unfruitful way which does not carry the mind forward or backward to any idea beyond itself; when this happens the power of viewing many things at once as a whole and of understanding their respective values is not developed (130). This is the way to distract the mind and enfeeble it, whereas

real education " is the preparation for knowledge and the imparting of knowledge in proportion to that preparation " (137).

In the sixth discourse the relation between liberal knowledge and professional knowledge is discussed. It follows from what has been said already that education cannot be confined to some particular and narrow end, such as issues in some definite work which can be weighed and measured, and that liberal education is not to be pursued because it makes a man a good engineer or lawyer or surgeon or helps manufactures or agriculture. He argues that the philosophy of utility will undermine a university and reduce it to the level of a number of technical or professional schools. Of course Newman does not deny that knowledge, which has its end in itself, has also its uses in itself. He compares a healthy body and a healthy mind, and says that health in both is a good which can then be put to useful pursuits. A healthy body can perform some manual work and a healthy mind can be devoted to some profession, but the latter cannot rightly be called the culture of the intellect in itself, even though professional knowledge can aid the general culture of the mind. Thus while a university ought to teach professional studies, such professional knowledge cannot be the sufficient end of university education, since one essential aim of a university is to enable a man to take a survey of all knowledge and see the relevancy and interdependence of its several parts. It is only this view which can make men who are larger than the means by which they earn their living and which respects the rational nature of man as such. Of requisite knowledge and cultivated faculties the second is prior in importance to the first, and a man who has been trained to think upon one subject only will never be a good judge even in that one. Hence he would be against premature specialization.

In the seventh discourse Newman considers the relation between liberal knowledge and religion. He claims that liberal knowledge can be said to have a kind of religion of its own and as such can both co-operate with Christianity or criticize and oppose it. While reason rightly exercised will lead the mind to faith, yet as a matter of fact it is far from taking so direct a road always. Nature does not necessarily lead to grace and even when it does lead to grace it is distinct from it. The Church takes its stand upon " the ruined state of man " (177) and his " fearful subjection to sense " (178), but the religion of liberal knowledge or civilization can do something to refine the mind and give some kind of standards to man's nature—*e.g.*, it can help the development of " veracity, probity, fairness, gentleness and benevolence " (184), but there is a great danger in all this of a certain shallowness which is concerned merely with what is becoming, so that even conscience becomes a moral sense. It can well end up in a continuous act of self-contemplation. This

whole chapter is a wonderful analysis of the limitations to which the philosophical religion, which survives at universities (so far as it does survive), is so prone when it is dissociated from the religion of revelation. It is this chapter which contains the famous passage on the definition of a gentleman; people have often quoted it without realizing that Newman was really pointing out the insufficiency of the ideal of a gentleman there portrayed when it is cut off from deeper and more Christian foundations.

In the eighth discourse Newman finally considers the duties of the Church towards liberal knowledge. Here he contends that the Church should be in a position to " breathe her own pure and unearthly spirit into it " (211); otherwise university teaching will increasingly diverge from revealed truth, will make present utility more and more its aim, and will lead back to the old heresy of " Man the measure of all things ", to foolish trust in unredeemed human nature. The only dogma which such a university would allow is that there must be no dogma. Thus he prophesies that physical science even will be the loser if theology is not in a position to influence those who study physical science, while literature and history are obviously open to the most false interpretations of life which will have disastrous effects on society (dialectical materialism is a striking proof of Newman's foresight in this regard).

The last chapter in the book is a lecture on " Christianity and Scientific Investigation ". The cardinal maxim in a university should be that truth cannot be contrary to truth, but it must be recognized that truth often *seems* contrary to truth and apparent incompatibilities must be put up with for a time; the necessary thing is " to go on quietly and in a neighbourly way in specialized research with full faith in the consistency of all truth " (245). Neither the prohibition of inquiry nor the arm of force is the best way of safeguarding truth in any of its aspects. Theology, least of all the sciences, has any reason to be nervous about collisions of opinion. The point in question will eventually turn out (*a*) not to be proved or (*b*) not to be contradictory or (*c*) not to be contradictory to anything revealed. Moreover, it is important that the Church should remember that it can often fight scepticism with the weapons of free discussion on philosophical grounds as was done by the Dominican and Franciscan Doctors in the medieval universities. Just as then, so now there are those who would withdraw from the use of such weapons and from any living relations with university life. Newman would oppose such a policy The Church should insist upon free investigation in all the sciences simultaneously and should remember that the best way to truth in some circumstances is through error, when its results are shown up. The main thing is honest intentions, no love of causing scandals, a recognition of the moral weakness and intellectual confusion of the majority

of minds, and a confidence that erroneous speculations will be corrected in the course of the next half-century (259).

I have tried in the above to give as accurate as possible an idea of the contents of this famous book. I will only permit myself one general remark. What is the mind of the Church here and now upon these great issues? What steps is she proposing to take to see that her own students of theology have an adequate background of general culture and "liberal knowledge" on which to build their theology? Newman's book reads as a great ideal in view of present-day tendencies, but there is always something crucial which can be done in reaching out towards some normative ideal; is the Church ready and willing to take those steps?

H. K. Archdall.

THEOLOGY AND MISSIONS

Dr P. A. Micklem's article, "Missions and Christology", in the May number of this review brought into prominence the "crucial differences of theological outlook" that at present exist among those engaged in missionary work. That these existed was known to most of those workers, for it has been revealed in much recent missionary literature, and in particular by the work produced by members of the Tambaram Conference of 1938. It is of great importance that the Church as a whole should also realize the position, for missionary workers, even more than parish priests in this country, are often too absorbed by the multitude of the tasks that confront them day by day to be able to give much study to the theological implications of their work, even when they have the desire and capacity to do so. Nor are the problems involved very different from those that parish priests and all engaged in evangelistic work in this country need to solve. This last point was illustrated by some remarks of Mr Bruce in Theology for December last. Here is something that theologians ought to tackle, not as isolated intellectuals, but as members of the Church with a vital function to perform.

Dr Micklem illustrated what he meant by "crucial differences" by outlining the theological standpoints of Dr Kraemer and Fr de Lubac. These two scholars are well chosen as able to speak for the "dialectical theology" of modern Protestantism and the classical theology of Roman Catholicism. But what does Dr Micklem mean by calling his article "Missions and *Christology*"? Can it be said that Christology is the point at issue? It is true that "the missionary approach to the non-Christian world is bound up with assumptions which run back to the doctrine of the Incarnation". It is also true that these writers, although differing so much in their missionary approach, are at one in their Christology. Fr de Lubac will not be suspected

of holding anything but the full Catholic doctrine of the Person of Christ. What of Dr Kraemer? Those who know his book *The Christian Message in the Non-Christian World* are not likely to doubt his orthodoxy in this article of the faith. In Christology we believe it is fair to say that in all essentials his position and approach is that made familiar by Dr Brunner in *The Mediator*. It is pertinent to recall that Canon J. K. Mozley in his foreword to the English translation writes: "The Christ of whom he writes is the Christ of the apostolic Gospel and of the historic Faith." These words can be applied to Kraemer as well as to Brunner. It is important for this to be realized, for Kraemer's work is not likely to be held in much regard by Catholics if he is treated as a Christological heretic. It has the further result of forcing us to look elsewhere for the real point at issue.

We believe that this is: What attitude must those who believe in "the Christ of the apostolic Gospel and of the historic faith" adopt to the non-Christian systems of life and thought? It is here that theology to-day is called upon to give guidance to the whole Church Militant, whether that Church is at work in England or America or the East.

A reading of the last part of Dr Micklem's article might seem, at first sight, to deny this, for it is there maintained that the type of attitude that most Anglicans would adopt is in no doubt. It is that which is put forward in Dr L. E. Browne's essay in *Essays Catholic and Missionary*, published in 1928. The date is noteworthy, for it recalls the Missionary Conference held at Jerusalem in that year, where, to quote Dr Micklem, "Christianity and the non-Christian religions were not so much contrasted with each other as regarded as sharers in a common witness to the supremacy of the spiritual in human life and society, against the might and menace of a secular civilization, considered at that time the arch-antagonist of all that religion stands for." "At that time" is right! Now we realize that the battle is not one of religion *v.* secularism but of Christianity *v.* paganism. Surely we are not expected to adopt *en bloc* the attitude of 1928 or to ignore entirely all the criticism that has been directed against this attitude since then.

This criticism is summed up in the book of Kraemer to which reference has been made. The Tambaram Conference of 1938 was much influenced by it, although most of the delegates (a majority of whom had been brought up on liberal Evangelical theology in England or America) found much to reject in it. It has not received the attention it deserves in theological circles in this country. It is impossible to give an account of its arguments here, but we believe that many Catholics would hold that Kraemer has made a strong case for the rejection of the type of approach to non-Christian systems of life and thought that is expressed in Dr Browne's essay and that dominated the Jerusalem conference of 1928. His criticisms of this approach are based

on a deep understanding both of the Christian gospel and of what he calls "the non-Christian systems of life and thought" and are directed against any justification of the finality of Christianity on the ground of its unique capacity for incorporating into itself "all that is best from every quarter". It is difficult to agree with Dr Micklem that, after having faced these criticisms, modern Anglican theology will be satisfied with the attitude to non-Christian faiths characteristic of 1928.

These non-Christian faiths are all around us wherever we are, and it is an urgent need for the Church everywhere that its theologians should give careful attention to the problem. There is need for a study of the real nature of the "opposition". Kraemer's insistence that the great non-Christian religions are not mere collections of doctrines and ideals, some to be accepted and some rejected, but "all-inclusive systems and indivisible unities", is of as great importance to those who war against humanism and Marxism as to those opposed by Hinduism or Islam. Readers of THEOLOGY who followed the controversy between Mr Bruce and Professor Quick will see the importance of this. We are also witnessing at this moment the progress of the flood-tide of Nazi conquest, giving ever greater scope for the propagation of the Nazi "system of life and thought". It may be that the nearest historical parallel is the challenge to Christianity of Islam's early triumphal progress, and the fate of some parts of the Church in those days must show the need for great faith and true theological guidance to oppose this *Weltanschauung*.

The position at the moment with regard to theological guidance is disquieting. Kraemer wrote, after Tambaram: "The amount of agreement and mutual understanding in regard to this problem [the relation of the Christian revelation and Christianity as an historical religion to the non-Christian religions] reached at Tambaram has been appallingly small . . . the great danger that threatens our international discussions on Christian topics is not so much an undue and unchristian acerbity as a generous politeness that . . . covers an indifference to or an impatience with each other's presuppositions." Anglican theology may be able to help in several directions if it holds the full Catholic faith and makes itself familiar with the new knowledge of the non-Christian systems. At present not only is the amount of agreement small but there is a tendency to ignore the great Catholic theologians of past centuries. As an Anglican reviewer of *The Authority of the Faith* said, "Apart from Dr Kraemer's citation of Clement, you would think nothing had been thought about nature and grace, or revelation and natural religion, between the end of the New Testament and 1932." Here is surely a call for Anglican theology to help the World Mission of the Church to-day.

EPSOM. N. J. BLOW.

LONDON'S BURNING !

[A friend to whom I sent, in a private letter, the substance of what follows urged me to have it printed. At first I refused, since my experience of the terror by night is trivial in comparison with that of most people who are out in raids. But it may after all be worth printing, for the benefit of one particular circle of readers. I at least shall never be tempted in future to apologize for the eschatological passages of the New Testament.]

It was London's worst air raid and I was patrolling the street in a district slightly above the surrounding level, so that I could see for many miles. The sights and sounds of that night naturally expressed themselves in biblical language. " Fearful sights and great signs shall there be in heaven " (Luke xxi, 11). First came the flares, slowly descending: " the stars of heaven shall fall, and the powers that are in heaven shall be shaken " (Mark xiii, 25); " the stars of heaven fell unto the earth " (Rev. vi, 13). Then the high-explosive bombs were dropped, with their trail of destruction and death. I thought of the thousands hiding in shelters, deep down in the tube stations, or in the caves of Chislehurst: they " hid themselves in the dens and in the rocks of the mountains " (Rev. vi, 15). Several times I saw a great rose-coloured circle of flame arise from the ground and slowly descend; this was what a landmine meant to an observer several miles away. On one occasion a barrage balloon near by was hit, apparently by a descending landmine. The explosion in mid-air was terrific and the gas ignited and surged out with a great light, and in two or three seconds all was silent and dark. It came and went " in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye ", as " at the last trump " (1 Cor. xv, 52). All the time incendiaries were falling—" hail and fire . . . were cast upon the earth " (Rev. viii, 7).

On another night, nearly as bad, we had a lull between 1.30 and 2: " there was silence in heaven about the space of half an hour " (Rev. viii, 1). On a third night we had a respite when the smoke of the fires in Central London obscured the moon: " there arose a smoke, as the smoke of a great furnace: and the air was darkened by reason of the smoke " (Rev. ix, 2). On each of the great raid nights millions of pounds' worth of property was destroyed. " Alas, alas, that great city . . . in one hour so great riches is come to nought . . . (they) cried when they saw the smoke of her burning, saying, What city is like unto this great city ! . . . in one hour is she made desolate " (Rev. xviii, 16-19).

Akoimetos.

BOOK REVIEWS

NOBLE CASTLE. By Christopher Hollis. Longmans. 8s. 6d.

Mr Hollis is already known as a writer on contemporary politics, but he believes that the ultimate and effective cause of the difficulties of our time is not Hitler or Stalin or Mussolini, Communism or Fascism or the Treaty of Versailles, but our excessive concentration on the topical, our refusal to learn from the past, and our futile attempt to solve the problems of Man without first asking what is the nature of Man and what is his proper aim. *Noble Castle* is an attempt to remove some of the objections that stand between the modern world and the Christian answers.

The book opens with a somewhat perfunctory statement of the Thomist position as against Kant, and in this the author is not altogether happy. Thus in attacking a purely empirical view of knowledge he uses an illustration from geometry as an example of " the necessities of reason ", forgetting that by so doing he is begging the question: the quarrel with which he is concerned is one that has its counterpart in mathematics—it is not every mathematical philosopher who would agree that our beliefs about triangles have " nothing at all to do with the experience of any near-triangles that we may have come across in actual life ". However, as we read on, we find that the point is unimportant: Mr Hollis realizes that rational proofs of the existence of God are not convincing to everybody, and although from time to time he recurs to his Thomist doctrines the main part of his book is not wholly dependent on them.

Mr Hollis contends, as others have done before, that in Homer there is an implicit criticism of Greek religion, a hint that man can be better than the gods. In Greek tragedy, too, he finds an aspiration towards Christian morality, and a perception of contradictions in man's nature that can be resolved only by the Christian doctrines of Original Sin and Redemption. " Greece ", as G. K. Chesterton said, " had come to think all that Man can think and to see that it was not enough." Mr Hollis then examines the yearning for a divine Incarnation, and following the movement of pagan thought from Greece to Rome he considers the history of pagan cults as predecessors of Christianity and as attempts to reach out towards the truth. " No student of religion can possibly deny, or can possibly wish to deny, the existence of what may at least be called *a priori* similarity between other religions and Christianity." Mr Hollis regards this similarity as evidence of the truth of Christianity rather than of its falsehood; but he knows very well that nothing can be definitely proved in this way, and that no rationalistic " progressive ethical creed " can take the place or serve the purposes of a religion based on the historical truth of the Resurrection.

Mr Hollis has taken his title from Canto CVI of the *Inferno*, and towards the end of his book he considers the work of Dante as at once the highest development of the pagan tradition and the most revealing exposition of the implications of Christian doctrines and Christian history; and he ends by reminding us that the questions the world must ask to-day are those that were asked by Aeschylus and Vergil and answered by St Augustine and Dante.

MICHAEL ROBERTS.

TRAINING IN CHRISTIANITY. By Sören Kierkegaard, translated with an Introduction and Notes by Walter Lowrie. O.U.P. 12s. 6d.

FOR SELF-EXAMINATION and JUDGE FOR YOURSELVES! By Sören Kierkegaard, translated by Walter Lowrie. O.U.P. 10s. 6d.

In these two volumes Dr Lowrie has introduced us to Kierkegaard's thought in just that phase which is probably of most value to his readers to-day. *Training in Christianity* was published in 1850 and was in the nature of an ultimatum served on the Danish Church, and on Bishop Mynster in particular: let that Church confess before the world that it is something very much less than Christian, that it is in fact a sorry compromise with the world, and then God in His mercy will grant it the only right it can ever possess to call itself by the Christian name. It was published pseudonymously, whereas *For Self-Examination* appeared the following year with the author's own name alone on the title-page. For some reason *Judge for Yourselves* was not given to the public during the lifetime of Kierkegaard. The purpose of these two works is essentially the same as that of *Training in Christianity*. This last book should be read even by those who are unwilling to read anything else by Kierkegaard, for nowhere is a better guide to his thought to be found.

These major works are accompanied by slighter ones, sermons or "edifying discourses" (was it necessary to offend our English ear with so literal a translation?) which express a simpler and more direct Christian faith than is to be met with in much that Kierkegaard wrote. The man himself cannot be judged on any one book; the whole of his many-sided activity must be taken into account.

Training in Christianity is an exposition of three passages of Scripture: Matt. xi, 28, xi, 6, and John xii, 32. The theme is the same throughout—Christ. But what is stressed in Christ is not so much His personality or His teaching as His metaphysical status as the God-Man. As such He is absolute paradox and an affront to all the considerations of human reason: "the moth which flies into the candelight is not more sure of destruction than the man who attempts to will to comprehend Him or that

which is in Him combined: God and man " (81). Faith is the acceptance of this historical individual as at the same time Almighty God. That was what it meant for the first disciples, and the challenge is the same for us: for each generation is contemporary with that Figure. The centuries which have elapsed since He was on the earth do not alter that situation, as the much-vaunted permeation of society with Christian principles does not provide any objective proof of who Christ is. Rather must we think all such considerations away, that we may then confront the God-Man for ourselves, to " believe " or to " take offence ". To believe is no easy thing, for it commits one to the Christian life, a life of martyrdom and suffering for the truth without any hope of relief except in eternity. For Christianity is a challenge to all human standards; from the ordinary point of view it " seems like hatred for the ideal of what it is to be a man " (119).

The Church, of course, has altered all this and has produced an easy version of what it means to be a Christian, so that the clergy can enjoy comfortable livings, the professors can incorporate sin and salvation into systems of Hegelian idealism, and the common man can be satisfied, because in these days " we are all Christians ". It is against this delusion that Kierkegaard lodges his protest: " Christendom has done away with Christianity, without being quite aware of it. The consequence is that, if anything is to be done, one must try again to introduce Christianity into Christendom " (39).

Not that he imagines that the Christianity he preaches is practicable: he frankly admits that it is not. The only virtue which he claims is that of sincerity; he grants that to be a Christian is beyond him, while the Church identifies her compromise-message with the absolute truth. Thus he summons the Church and all Christians to acknowledge how far short of the ideal they have fallen, and then to receive God's grace as an indulgence. What he urges is not a reform—against any effort of that kind he protests most vehemently—but the frank acknowledgment that one's Christianity " is not the true Christianity, it is an approximation " (*Judge for Yourselves*, 216).

Later, to be sure, Kierkegaard recognized that this too was to evade God's claim, and that Christianity must either be obeyed or abandoned. He had said in these two volumes that Christ will have followers, not admirers; he now saw that he had called for admirers rather than followers when he treated grace " as a sort of dispensation from the actual following of Christ " (*Training*, xxvi). Dr Lowrie regrets that he took this step and tries to remain behind at the earlier position, but this is to evade his challenge.

There is something massive and arresting in Kierkegaard's thought; it has the great merit that it forces upon one a personal decision. In his own words, one must either believe or take offence. The present reviewer can only say that while he

approached originally Kierkegaard as a believer, long application to his writings has forced him, much against his will, to join the ranks of those who take offence. Between the Christ of the Gospels and the Christ of *Training in Christianity*, the austere God-Man in comparison with whose gospel the yoke of Moses is easy and the burden of the rabbis is light, he can see little or no connexion. In the words of a young Dane: "One must encounter Kierkegaard, yes, but one must overcome him."

NEWCASTLE-UPON-TYNE. E. L. ALLEN.

"THE HOMILY ON THE PASSION" BY MELITO, BISHOP OF SARDIS, AND FRAGMENTS OF THE APOCRYPHAL EZEKIEL, edited by Campbell Bonner (being Volume XII of *Studies and Documents*). Christophers. 20s.

There has been found in Egypt at some place and time unknown a tall papyrus codex of the fourth century, consisting of twenty-eight or thirty leaves. Such as it was, the finders dismembered it, and it duly appeared as separate lots in the hands of dealers. Mr Chester Beatty bought eight leaves and three fragments. The University of Michigan obtained six more leaves. Comparison of the Beatty Collection share with the Michigan share establishes the fact that the fourteen leaves originally formed the middle quire of the codex, while the fragments are from later pages of the same codex. If the two groups were united the text of Melito would cover the last half-page of leaf 6 and the following eight leaves. The fragments contain matter belonging to an apocryphal Ezekiel known to Clement of Alexandria.

Of Mr Bonner's volume, by far the greater part, both in space and in importance, is devoted to the Homily of Melito. Eight pages suffice to make all that can be made of the pseudo-Ezekiel.

The task of editing the Homily must have been a heavy one. It involved the reconstruction of many lost ends of lines, and of faded lettering. Mr Bonner has used, for supplement and comparison, the Oxyrhynchus fragment (Papyrus 1600 at the Bodleian) and fragmentary versions, the Coptic fragment from Wadi Sarga now in the British Museum, Cureton's Syriac excerpts, and a Syriac fragment in a different version published by Pitra under the name of Alexander of Alexandria. In the upshot he is able to offer, despite lacunæ, substantially a complete text of the Homily.

This text he prints on left-hand pages as it can be deciphered from the papyrus codex, and on right-hand pages as reconstructed. To each such double page there is a full footnote commentary. An English translation follows the text, and 82 pages of excellent introduction precede it.

One particularly interesting section of the introduction deals

with the Angel who rent the veil of the temple. Section 98 of the Homily contrasts the indifference of the Jews at the crucifixion with the emotion of the world-powers. "The people trembled not, the earth trembled; though the people feared not, the heavens were afraid; though the people rent not their garments, the angel rent his" (περιεσχίσατο ὁ ἄγγελος).

Mr Bonner infers dependence on an uncanonical Gospel, and collects a number of early passages attributing the rending of the veil to angelic agency. It may well be. But comparison of the Epiphany star passage in Ignatius *ad Ephesios* with St Matthew suggests not so much another formal source as a kind of Christian *midrash* on St Matthew. And the like may be true of these versions of the rending of the veil. Like Ignatius, Melito seems to know Matthew and John, as presumably do his hearers. But the allusiveness and freedom with which they are treated sets them on a different footing from Old Testament scripture.

A special interest of the Homily, as Mr Bonner says, is that it shows us the existence of stylized Christian oratory a full generation before Hippolytus and Origen. But then the Quartodeciman Pascha, to which the Homily evidently belongs, was an occasion that might claim such embellishment, rather as liturgy than as preaching, and long before rhetoric was employed in ordinary homiletics.

Mr Bonner has not noticed the relation to our Homily of the fragment in Migne (*P.G.* v. 1217) from a catena on Genesis. It treats of Isaac as a type of Christ altogether in the manner of our Homily. In the latter we have the two brief allusions to this typology: ἀπόβλεψον . . . εἰς τὸν Ἰσάκ τὸν ὁμοίως ποδιζόμενον, with which we may compare the catena ἦν οὖν ἐν μέσῳ προκείμενος Ἰσαὰκ πεποδισμένος; and Christ ὡς κριὸς ἐδέθη in the catena is answered by Christ ἐν Ἰσὰκ δεθείς in the Homily. But the catena fragment is full and eloquent in its elaboration of this typology, while our Homily implies that the typology is known.

May we not conjecture that the catena fragment was taken from *another* paschal homily? It seems likely enough that for a Quartodeciman bishop an oration on these lines was a necessity at every Pascha. And if this were so, the parallels in Apollinaris of Hierapolis noted by Mr Bonner on p. 56 need no other explanation than that the two writers had to address themselves to a task of which the general lines were determined by the liturgical tradition of the Quartodeciman churches. Likewise the passages set out by Mr Bonner from Hippolytus, *On the Pascha*, may not, as he says, "suggest the influence of Melito", but merely that Hippolytus was in close relations with the Asiatic Christian element in Rome, a thing we have several independent reasons for suspecting. And all through Mr Bonner's section "On the Influence of the Homily" the same possibility

is worth considering—namely, that there existed a type of Paschal homily of which this by Melito is a particularly fine example, and that it is the type rather than our particular text that is reflected in the literature which Mr Bonner reviews.

The discovery of this text has brought one of the richer accessions of recent days to our knowledge of early Christianity; and Mr Campbell Bonner has done his work as editor with a competence, thoroughness, and clarity that put us all very much in his debt.

W. Telfer.

Cambridge.

The New Testament in Basic English. Cambridge University Press. 8s. 6d.

There are necessarily two points of view from which any translation of the New Testament must be judged: (i) accuracy of translation; (ii) English literary value. Basic English is a system of English consisting of 850 words, enlarged for the present purpose to a thousand, and "used in accordance with a few simple rules". It is claimed that it is "the best first step to complete English".

If this simplified English, developed by Mr C. K. Ogden, is found to be useful and to last, it will obviously be a good thing that the Bible should exist in it, supposing that that can be done without the Bible being over-simplified. The difficulties are obvious; so are the advantages. As the jacket points out, you have in Basic English at least to say *something*. Whether what you say is nearer or farther from the original than the Authorized Version is another matter, and one the present writer is incompetent to judge. He understands more clearly, however, the difficulties of the Church when translation first began.

On the literary side, though this system avoids rhetoric, it is bound to introduce clumsiness. One has to say "have knowledge" instead of "know" and "have love" instead of "love", and so with belief and hate. "Whoever puts you to death will have the belief that he is doing God's pleasure." The omission of the verb "look", by the accidental slang of our time, is still more awkward. Of St Mary Magdalene: "While she was still weeping she took a look into the hole"; and in the Apocalypse: "No one in heaven, or on the earth, or under the earth, was able to get the book open or to take a look at it." A similar vulgarization takes place just before in St John's vision: "And there was a circle of coloured light round the throne, like an emerald." A circle of coloured light is too like firework displays.

It would be unfair merely to pick out such things; they can be paralleled by others which, if not sudden illuminations, are variations which arouse the attention. "'Every lover of what is true gives ear to My voice.' Pilate said to Him: 'True? What is true?'" It was not, perhaps, merely abstract truth

about which Pilate was thinking; he did perhaps fundamentally disbelieve in the possibility of reliable evidence. So even with St Paul's " I have been put to death on the cross with Christ; still I am living; no longer I, but Christ is living in me; and that life which I now am living in the flesh I am living by faith." The last phrase even seems to emphasize the derivation of the flesh from faith.

Shades of changing meaning cannot be expressed, and in a general way the translation has no speed. But it has clear value in a number of ways, and especially as a book of continual suggestiveness. It is, in a literary sense, a step in the wrong direction; obviously to reduce the vocabulary of a language is to blunt the instrument of the mind. We do not invent words only for fun. And even when the prospectus claims for it more " directness " than the Authorized Version, it goes too far: " By this time the body will be smelling " is nothing like " By this time he stinketh ". It has inevitably a faint reflection of the cheapness of journalism; that is not so much its fault as journalism's. Except in the Epistles. It was St Paul who gave us the Christian vocabulary; it is St Paul whose passion burns in all the variations.

CHARLES WILLIAMS.

OXFORD.

THE ETERNTIY OF TIME. By A. P. Shepherd. Hodder and Stoughton. 8s. 6d.

Theological discussions of the problem of time have been unsatisfactory chiefly because of their tendency to assert that time is " unreal ". Even if it were established that there is some sense in which time is " unreal " it *cannot* be established that at least part of reality—namely, our experience—is not in time. There is another tendency which avoids the problems by assuming that the notion of eternity has merely a qualitative sense with no reference to " everlastingness "—but this view has to face the difficulty that the ideas we have of qualitative worth entail reference to experiences *in time*. Again, there are the devotees of science who are interested merely in the before-and-after relationship of events and have, then, been misled into confusing such discussions with discussions about the past-present-future characteristic of our temporal cognitions. This confusion has led certain theologies to pay great attention to law and uniformity and scant attention to consciousness and personality, and to change as it affects these. Theological discussion should be concerned with perceptual time and (if we must use scientific terms) with events AT the observer. Dr Shepherd realizes this, and he faces the question (which is implicit throughout his book)—" What is there in our temporal awareness over and above a simple awareness of before and after or of simultaneity ?" Over and above a succession of experiences

we have an experience of their succession, and this latter experience is not *merely* another experience in the series, but it entails conceptual formulation and leads to the passing of value judgments. (This is part of Dr Shepherd's doctrine of " Construction ". This word has a bad philosophical reputation. But the argument is valid as against certain behaviourist psychologies and certain realist theories of knowledge.)

There are senses in which present experiences modify the past and in which the future exercises a determining influence upon present experience. Our past can be subjected to a new interpretation by our present, and when the past is apprehended in a new context of relationships it is modified. This can be seen in the moral life—*e.g.*, in repentance, when something in the present *transforms* the past act, giving it a new significance. If this were not so the command to repent would be pointless. Likewise we do not merely contemplate ourselves in the future, we adjust our present to future events—and this adjustment is often an austere undertaking, which it would certainly not be if we *knew* the future to be non-existent.

Systems of experience differ in regard to the richness of their content, and this in turn is partly determined by the extent to which the immediate present is transcended. Types of human beings—*e.g.*, libertines—have a moment-to-moment existence that is generally associated with animals, but the moral and religious person will transcend this moment-to-moment existence.

For Dr Shepherd the notion of " eternity " is *suggested* by this notion of a comprehensive experience which is causally determined by the adjustment of every past and future in a spacious present. This view is compatible with theological doctrines like the doctrine of judgment, of immortality (as distinguished from mere survival), and it emphasizes the austerity of the moral life.

I should, however, like to see Dr Shepherd's reply to the following points: What would he say to a critic who accepts a non-theistic metaphysic and who is prepared to accept the doctrine of the " eternity " of time in the sense indicated, but who also says that the argument merely establishes a characteristic of our temporal experience *in this life*? And how would he answer a person who agrees that the name " mind " should be denied to a jumbled aggregate of mental events that are poor in content, but who also says that the " mind " is *exhaustively* defined in terms of mental events systematically related, and that there is no need to postulate a persisting " self " which " has " these experiences and which is immortal?

These two questions are integral to Dr Shepherd's metaphysical position.

H. Islwyn Davies.

Lampeter.

The Future in Education. By Sir Richard Livingstone. Cambridge University Press. 3s. 6d.

This little book of under a hundred and thirty pages by the President of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, is a tract for the times, written in a white heat, full of passionate but controlled urgency, and it ought to be read by everyone who is in any way concerned with the reform of education after the war. It will cut across the plans of most of them. Very few of them can be expected to agree with it. But at least it does ask radical questions, and it does dare to face the fundamental question. Sir Richard's belief in continuation schools and in adult education in residential colleges as means to help those whose power to learn is developing with their understanding of life is certainly significant and important. But more important is his thorough disbelief in what is being done now, his trenchant attack on the teaching of politics, economics, modern history, and social science in elementary and secondary schools where the children have no experience to help them to understand it, and upon most of the other items in our "tortuous and ungodly jumble". "What an amazing and chaotic thing it is! One subject after another is pressed into this bursting portmanteau which ought to be confined to the necessary clothes for a journey through life, but becomes a wardrobe of bits of clothes for any emergency: and from time to time someone discovers a new need and points out how ignorant we are of the U.S.A. or of our Dominions or of Latin America, and urges the inclusion of Colonial or American history or of Italian or Spanish or Russian". The result is the culture of the *Daily Mirror*, the philosophy of "Metro-Goldwyn and Beaverbrook". And the only practical way to deal with the situation is not by improved surveys of the state of the modern world, handed out to children who do not know what we are talking about, and undergraduates who are little better off, but more literature and history, more of the unpractical subjects.

I am not sure that Sir Richard does not rather underestimate the difficulties in restoring poetry to its rightful place in the education of the young in a society which has so little use for it. He sees clearly enough that we only come to appreciate what we learnt by heart at school, of Shakespeare and Virgil, in the light of mature experience. But we who did learn them by heart received them from a tradition which spoke to us with authority. I do not think that the young of to-day will begin to read critically while they are at school, and so start to develop in themselves that desire for the enlargement of experience that could carry them back to continuation classes and adult colleges, unless poetry and history are presented to them from the first in direct relation to present experience and present decision, and against an understood background in the reading-matter they know. We have to begin with the newspapers and advertisements and work outwards to Plato and the Bible. But that is only a

further application of Sir Richard's main argument, which ought to be welcomed as a most important contribution to the search, not for a compromise between secular and religious education, but for a concept and a method of liberal education which will restore concern for the development of the whole man and his response to life, without compelling us to resort to a segregation of churches and sects for educational purposes. We do need something like the Danish People's High School Movement. And we need Grundtvig to begin it. He was a theologian, and it is an interesting and rather surprising detail that of the eighty-nine graduates who were lately lecturing in the Danish P.H.S. fifty-three had degrees in theology. Yet the schools have never been confessional.

GEORGE EVERY, S.S.M.

KELHAM.

TALKS IN PREPARATION FOR CONFIRMATION. By R. W. Howard. National Society and S.P.C.K. 4s.

The need for a handbook on the subject of Confirmation is one that has made itself felt for some time among those who are responsible for the preparation of candidates, and schoolmasters in particular will welcome this timely and valuable contribution by the Headmaster of Liverpool College.

The general arrangement of the book is excellent. The author begins with a brief outline on the Nature and Being of God. There is a chapter on the subject of Revelation, and in the second part of the book we come to the subject proper, Baptism, the Catechism, the Confirmation service and Holy Communion The scheme in each chapter is well thought out and clear.

Mr Howard first of all explains the subject-matter and points this with some admirable illustrations. Then follows a prayer or two summing up the lessons of the chapter; and finally a synopsis of the whole, very useful for picking up the threads at the beginning of the next lesson.

The style is simple and lucid, and the illustrations carefully chosen. Perhaps the most striking of these are the five sparrows (on page 28, chapter 3) and the story of Artemas (in chapter 5, page 59).

If criticism is insisted upon, it must be confessed that one question will arise in the minds of many schoolmasters; it is as to whether the style and tone of the book are altogether suited to the hard-boiled and sophisticated fifteen-year-older. For the rather younger boy of twelve or thirteen nothing could be better; and older boys too will appreciate it, as will the adult teacher.

But many of those in the " wilderness of adolescence " may find a difficulty here. There is, for instance, the illustration (on page 78) of the small boy of four years old bending down " to pick bright flowers by the river-side ", falling in and being

rescued by Uncle John, who is himself (almost inevitably) drowned in the process; a simple and delightful story to many people, but it may cause a lifting of the eyebrow in the Upper Thirds.

Similarly the sentence on Prayer which begins " I come to thee, O Father; Thomas Henry speaking " may cause embarrassment in that particular *milieu*. Again, a boy of fifteen has often a very searching intelligence, and it is doubtful if he would readily accept such explanations as the author gives of the descent of the Dove at the Baptism of Christ or of the " tongues of fire " at Pentecost. Is it not often better to treat such matters frankly as mysteries, rather than to attempt explanations which cannot be more than possible conjectures ?

In a handbook of this size it is clearly not possible to do justice to a very large number of important subjects which come within the author's view, but one cannot help regretting the economy of space which prevented a rather more detailed treatment of Prayer and the Commandments and the age of Confirmation. A chapter on preparation for Communion, apart from the actual Service, would have been very welcome.

On the practical side Mr Howard has, as one would expect from a wise and experienced schoolmaster, some very valuable advice to give when dealing with such matters as Sunday observance, attendance at Communion and Christian practice generally. Every word he says is balanced and sensible.

This is, in brief, a very serviceable book which will be of greatest use to candidates and to teachers both in schools and parishes, and his colleagues in the profession will be most grateful to the author.

A. Ross Wallace.

Sherborne.

The Revelation of St John (The Moffatt New Testament Commentary). By Martin Kiddle, assisted by M. K. Ross. Hodder and Stoughton. 10s. 6d.

There is much that is extremely ingenious and interesting in the latest Moffatt Commentary on the New Testament; for instance, the insistence on the Egyptian colouring of ch. xii and of the analogy between the sufferings of the woman, the true Israel, and the earlier sufferings of Israel in the desert throws a considerable measure of light on one of the obscurest passages of the book. Mr Kiddle's explanation of the often grotesque features of apocalyptic symbolism is always learned and interesting, though at times over-ingenious. This is particularly noticeable in his treatment of the letters to the seven Churches, in which he finds a division into good, bad, and middling, which is to colour the whole book; thus it becomes clear that the book was intended as a unit from the beginning. This simply will not do; the situation in the first three chapters is the same as in the rest

of the early Christian writings of Asia Minor; there is a good deal of social inconvenience in being a Christian, but martyrdoms are so rare that Antipas stands out as, perhaps, the only one; but by vii, 9 *ff.* the martyrs are a great multitude which no man can number; we have a precisely similar inconsistency between the earlier chapters of 1 Peter and iv, 12 *ff.*

Nor do I feel that this commentary really faces the difficulties of the Apocalypse. Mr Kiddle recognizes that we have in it a basis of mystical experience, expounded in the language of a conventional apocalyptic. This is no doubt a true account of the origin and growth of this kind of literature; but what value are we to attach to the conventional language and symbolism, as opposed to some original germ of mystical experience, especially in the Apocalypse, which is one of the most elaborate specimens of the type? Nor is it really satisfactory to elude the ethical difficulties of the outlook of the Apocalypse by saying that while a Christian will refuse to see a direct divine intervention in a Lisbon earthquake, yet experience proves that nations do suffer proportionately to their crimes, since "few can claim to be completely guiltless in the matter of national and international wrongs". It is entirely impossible to prove even that nations are always "punished" by calamity for their "national" sins; it is obvious that the relatively innocent suffer as much or more than the relatively guilty. Probably this explanation will find much assent from contemporary homiletic, but it quite fails to justify God as against Abraham's awkward question, "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?"

There are a good many minor inaccuracies; thus in i, 3, *ὁ ἀναγινώσκων* does not mean "read aloud in church" any more than it does in Acts viii, 30; there is some evidence that the ancients always read aloud when reading to themselves, but the words mean no more than this. Nor is it accurate to say that St Paul's advice to the Corinthians on the matter of meats offered to idols was that they were to avoid rigorously any compromise on points of morality, but that otherwise they must do what was expedient without giving offence; what he says in 1 Cor. x, 25 is that they can eat anything unless they are definitely told that it has been offered to idols in circumstances which will give offence to the weaker brethren.

But the modern preacher who wishes to indulge in the apocalyptic style will find in this commentary an abundance of material.

CAMBRIDGE. WILFRED L. KNOX.

GOD AND HUMAN SUFFERING. By R. H. L. Slater. Epworth Press. 5s.

"We suffer; why we suffer, that is hid with God's foreknowledge in the clouds of Heaven"—so preached Fra Ugo Bassi;

and the problem will continue to furnish material for countless sermons, books, and essays as long as there are men to suffer. The little book now under review is a sincere and sympathetic attempt to penetrate the mystery—as presented by the Book of Job—and to interpret the same to " all those whose faith in Almighty God has been shaken by the suffering of this present time ".

The author, after speaking in his introduction of two occasions in his own life when " his mind was forced to recognize the full weight of the problem ", and when " all the easy arguments " he had written for " academic discussion shrivelled ", goes on to show that the problem of suffering is only part of the problem of evil; a problem which presses especially hard on the Christian who is taught to believe, at one and the same time, both in the power and in the goodness of God. He then proceeds to clear away " some preliminary difficulties ", such as crude and outworn ideas about the attributes and activities of God and inadequate conceptions as to the origin, nature, and true end of man, and to enumerate and discuss various attempted explanations regarding the existence of evil. These are briefly: that there are two sources of being, one the creator of all that is good and the other of all that is evil; that a limited god is ever struggling to create out of rough, intractable material " over against " Him the best universe possible; that evil is necessary as a spur to progress, and pain useful as giving warning of something wrong; and finally, that evil is negative, the mere absence of good.

All this is on sound, if unoriginal, lines; but on the constructive side I find the book disappointing and incomplete. There is a certain amount of inconsistency and overlapping due most probably to the fact that, as stated in the introduction, the book was written in haste; but there are many simplifications which seem quite unwarrantable, and greatly detract from the force of the argument. For example, in one passage Mr Slater writes: " I am convinced that the only man who can really help his neighbour in time of trouble is the man who helps him to face reality. *For him suffering will be suffering; evil will be evil; wrong wrong; ignorance ignorance.*" (The italics are mine.)

The chief fault of the book lies however in the fact that in spite of many tantalizing hints the author fails in his development of the specifically Christian view of the problem of evil. It is true that as Baron von Hügel says, " Christianity has not explained suffering and evil; no one has done so; no one can do so "; but Mr Slater might have made much more of a fine opportunity to point out that while Job was rendered speechless by contemplation of the unfinished symphony of creation, a song is put into the mouths of Christian sufferers contemplating the finished drama of redemption, and that not only because through the power of the Spirit they apprehend some part of its significance

in the reconciliation of apparent irreconcilables, in the " transcendence, utilization, transformation of sorrow, pain, and even of sin " (von Hügel), but also because by virtue of their membership in His mystical body they may fill up that which is lacking of the sufferings of Christ and be made partakers of His endless joy.

MARGUERITE HOWSE.

NEW RADNOR.

SHORTER NOTICES

A MONK IN MARGARET STREET. By Bernard Clements. A. R. Mowbray and Co. 3s. 6d.

TEACH ME THY STATUTES. By Philip Loyd, Bishop of Nasik. A. R. Mowbray and Co. 3s.

THE LOVELIEST LADY. By Phyllis Graham. Church Literature Association. 2s. 6d.

PATIENCE IN ADVERSITY. By V. Spencer Ellis. Church Literature Association. 1s. 6d.

It is a good sign that, despite paper shortage and war-time preoccupations, such books as these should continue to be published. They are small enough to have wide circulation. Moreover, of the four, only one (and that for a special reason) is concerned directly with the problem of " religion in war-time ", and it is essential that Christian people should, in these days, preserve (as " the world " finds it hard to do) such a sense of proportion as this implies.

Dom Bernard Clements, the *Monk in Margaret Street*, offers us a selection of sermons preached, some over the wireless, most from his own pulpit at All Saints', and a few elsewhere. Every age requires, and discovers, its own methods of effective preaching. By the standard of earlier, " classical " preachers, these sermons would appear slight, but Dom Bernard possesses directness and simplicity, a love of our Lord and of humanity, with a telling gift of vivid and often humorous illustration. And the main test is that they go home to the hearers of to-day. We are sorry he has allowed some less relevant matter to intrude into the later pages, and grudge the other sermons which he might have put in its place. Those who, like our author, have the duty and opportunity of consecutive ministry to a regular congregation will note with interest some of his subjects—two of the Parables, on which clergy are said seldom to preach nowadays " because we suppose everybody knows all about them "; two books of the Bible—Joel and the Psalms; character-sketches of Solomon in the Old Testament, and of Richard Meux Benson of Cowley in our own day.

In *Teach me Thy Statutes*, Bishop Loyd of Nasik again shares with others the fruits of his own meditation over many years. He

takes the 119th Psalm and interprets it in accordance with a clue suggested to him at Cuddesdon. The seven keywords, Word, Law, Testimonies, etc., which recur through the Psalm, are given their Christian equivalents, and the whole Psalm paraphrased verse by verse accordingly. Prefixed to each section are two passages from the Old and New Testaments, and, following each, three Collects of the Prayer Book which carry on the thought of chosen verses. Many who use the 119th Psalm constantly will be thankful for his suggestions, as well as for his examples of the principle of Scripture itself as an interpreter of Scripture, and of the amazing adaptability of the Collects.

Mrs Graham in *The Loveliest Lady* writes a series of short chapters, vividly retelling the life of the Blessed Virgin. She adheres rigidly to the Scriptural story—none need fear "Mariolatry"!—though a certain amount of imaginative detail is necessarily woven round the incidents. They should be useful for reading aloud to girls and mothers, and should help many to love better the Mother of the Lord.

The fourth book, by the Dean of St Asaph, deliberately and intentionally faces the problems set to Christian faith and living by the war. But his answers rightly take us deep into theology. The ground for the Christian's "*Patience in Adversity*" is shown to be a fuller grasp of the whole Redeeming Act of God in Jesus Christ, and in eighty pages he sketches well the bearing of the Christian doctrines of God, of Sin, of the Incarnation, Death, and Resurrection of Christ on the "sufferings of this present time". He takes as his motto a noble but too-little-familiar passage from the Visitation of the Sick: "There should be no greater comfort to Christian persons, than to be made like unto Christ, by suffering patiently adversities, troubles and sicknesses. For he himself went not up to joy, but first he suffered pain: he entered not into his glory before he was crucified. So truly our way to eternal joy is to suffer here with Christ"; and he concludes his exposition by claiming that "what Christ offers is not a way of escape from present suffering, but the power to bear suffering manfully". Mystery must remain, but God's call to man for co-operation with Him is true also of the call to suffering, with its co-operation by penitence, and its outgoing in sympathy, a readiness to "share the burden of suffering in hearts which are lifted up to Christ". This, brief though it is, is surely authentic Christian dealing with the problems of war-time.

HENFIELD. HENRY DE CANDOLE.

WINDOWS ON JERUSALEM. By a Religious of the Community of St Mary the Virgin, Wantage. Pax House. 2s. 6d.

This little book is by the learned and devout author of *The Wood*. As we should expect, it is full of good things. To begin

with, it is most attractive to the eye. The print is very beautiful and on the abbreviated paper cover there is an exquisite illustration of the theme of the book. We are looking at the back of a crucifix set in an open window, from which the Crucified gazes out upon the two Jerusalems—the old and the new.

It is not always very easy reading; and there are times when the reader wonders whether the Sister is not too determined to press the dialectic of " Chaos, Creation, Cosmos " rather farther than it will go. But the book as a whole is illuminating and abounds in suggestive thought.

The author's aim is to look at the present chaos of the world in the light of Christian faith, and her plan is to find the clue to present suffering in the story of redemption. In this story the seven Sayings of Calvary, and its Silences, are the central point: but they need to be looked at in their setting. They are therefore introduced by short studies of the Baptism, Temptation, Transfiguration, Triumphal Entry and Last Supper, and are concluded by a consideration of the Resurrection.

All through she finds the kernel of Christ's teaching in His identification of the Messiah with the Suffering Servant. His suffering is the essence of His Christhood. It is His willing self-identification with sinful and therefore suffering humanity which brings us back through our suffering to be what God intended us to be. Here is the glowing sentence in which she describes that self-identification and its immediate result: " The great tide of evil, pouring through His sinless soul as through a filter, finds nothing in it to match itself, only counteraction." Then comes the ultimate result in the re-making of mankind: " The hidden process that . . . was potentially completed on the Cross has known no intermission in the centuries since, and behind the hoarding of history the walls of New Jerusalem rise daily higher." But we must be ready to identify ourselves with the suffering Christ. There are three crosses: His, mine, other people's. It only needs the obedient will on our part, and the three crosses are made one.

✠ Kenneth Brechin.

We Have Seen Evil. By Rom Landau. Faber and Faber. 7s. 6d.

Our Present Discontent. By J. P. Smyth. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 3s. 6d.

Mr Rom Landau, who made an impression on the literary public with studies in personal character, is much less happy in political and theological analysis. In this book he is amateurish and superficial. Germany, it seems, is the instrument of supernatural evil forces, whilst England is the agent of the angels. Such a theme enables Mr Landau to excel in self-righteousness—

and optimism. The war and the way England is fighting it is a proof that our civilization is all right. Of course there are spots on the sun, which the newfound national unity will soon remove. A little bit of extra application of moral Vim will do the trick.

How can one argue with all this? Mr Landau may have seen some evil, but not much. There's a lot he hasn't seen, and if he will look a bit nearer home than Germany he may get a shock, which his brand of Churchless Christianity may not be able to absorb.

Father Smyth is a good deal nearer the bone than Mr Landau. His little book is a good piece of vigorous Catholic controversy, couched in simple language which can be understood without a theological training. He criticizes Liberalism and Capitalism as a false theory of freedom, which has resulted in the worship of naked force and unreason through Fascism and Communism. Social reconstruction must begin with a recognition that the individual must be subject to an objective law which is given, not by himself or society, but by God. The domination of laws by the Divine Law—this must be the foundation-stone of any new civilization.

D. R. DAVIES.

HULL.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.).

ALLEN AND UNWIN: J. Laird, *Mind and Deity* (10s. 6d.)

JAMES CLARKE: R. D. Richardson, *Christian Belief and Practice* (7s. 6d.).

DACRE PRESS: Iulia de Beausobre, *Creative Suffering* (6d.); Lucy Redpath, *Dante and the Present War* (6d.).

FABER AND FABER: W. H. Auden, *New Year Letter* (10s. 6d.); M. Roberts, *The Recovery of the West* (12s. 6d.).

FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION: Stephen Hobhouse, *Christ and our Enemies* (2d.).

LONGMANS: G. Glasgow, *Diplomacy and God* (7s. 6d.); *Putting Our House in Order* (3s. 6d.).

MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY PRESS: H. McLachlan, *The Religious Opinions of Milton, Locke and Newton* (7s. 6d.).

METHUEN: D. L. Sayers, *The Mind of the Maker* (6s.).

MOWBRAYS: Anon., *Years of Discretion* (1s. 6d.).

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS: E. R. Hardy, *Militant in Earth* (16s. 6d.).

S.C.M. PRESS: J. H. Oldham, *The Root of our Troubles* (6d.); A. R. Vidler, *Secular Despair and Christian Faith* (2s.).

W. H. SMITH AND SON (BOURNEMOUTH): Anna B. de Bary, *Songs of Spiritual Conquest* (2s. 6d.).

SOCIETY OF FRIENDS: *Obedience to Conscience* (2d.).

S.P.C.K.: J. P. Hodges, *The Riches of our Prayer Book* (1s. 6d.); W. O. E. Oesterley, *The Jews and Judaism during the Greek Period* (10s. 6d.); Anon., *Saints' Days* (2s. 6d.).

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